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THIS ARTICLE CRITIQUES A PROPOSAL to include tribal court
criminal convictions and sentences in the federal sentencing scheme.
The proposal, as articulated by Kevin Washburn, calls for an amend-
ment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines1 to count tribal court con-
victions in calculating an Indian defendant’s criminal history score to
determine a federal prison sentence.2 Currently, tribal court convic-
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1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009) [hereinafter USSG]. Promulgated in
1987, with the express goals of uniformity in sentencing, and just punishment, the USSG
were passed as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and replaced judicial discretion
in federal sentencing with a set of guidelines, outlining the six-month sentencing range for
the defendant based upon his criminal history and the seriousness of the offense. The
Guidelines are advisory only after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005). See infra Part II.
2. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 426
(2004) [hereinafter Washburn, Tribal Courts]; Kevin K. Washburn, A Different Kind of Symme-
try, 34 N.M. L. REV. 263, 288–89 (2004) [hereinafter Washburn, Different Kind]; Kevin K.
Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 213 (2005)
[hereinafter Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment]; Kevin K. Washburn, Fed-
37
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tions are not directly counted in criminal history, but may be used to
support an “upward departure” to increase the Native defendant’s
overall federal sentence.3
Washburn’s proposal seeks to gain “respect” for tribal courts,
based upon a premise that tribal convictions must be afforded the
same weight and treatment as federal and state criminal convictions
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.4 This Article explores the
idea of respect for tribal courts and convictions in the context of their
history and connection to tribal peoples and communities. Ultimately,
this Article concludes that respectful treatment would not tolerate
placing a tribal defendant in such a powerless position within the fed-
eral sentencing hierarchy.
A proposal that would negatively impact only Native American
defendants in a foreign justice system in the name of respect warrants
critical review. As an Assistant Federal Public Defender, I had the op-
portunity to view the application of federal criminal laws from the
front and the back end of the criminal justice system, from trial to
post-conviction. As a Native woman, I have seen the impact of crime,
justice, and federal sentencing on tribal people, families, and whole
communities.
eral Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 840 (2006) [hereinafter
Washburn, Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination].
3. USSG § 4A1.2(i) (“Sentences resulting from tribal court convictions are not
counted, but may be considered under §4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Cate-
gory).”). This means that if a sentencing judge considers an Indian defendant’s criminal
history score to be inadequate to reflect the seriousness of his past criminal history, the
judge may use tribal court records to increase the defendant’s sentence above and beyond
the applicable federal sentencing range. See United States v. Drapeau, 110 F.3d 618, 620
(8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the district court appropriately applied an upward depar-
ture to reflect the defendant’s tribal offenses); United States v. Cavanaugh, 68 F. Supp. 2d
1062, 1074 (D.N.D. 2009) (“Today, the Sentencing Guidelines allow for consideration of
tribal court convictions when determining the adequacy of criminal history and courts
have the discretion to consider uncounseled tribal convictions when sentencing a defen-
dant in federal court.”). Washburn puts it this way: “Under the guidelines as enacted, tribal
and foreign court sentences are not routinely counted in criminal history computations,
but constitute a “favored” basis for upward departure.” Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note
2, at 416.
4. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 405, 418, 444, 450 (“The Commission
should change its tribal courts policy and recognize that the sentences of tribal courts are
entitled to the same respect as state courts sentences in the federal sentencing regime.”);
Washburn, Different Kind, supra note 2, at 288–89; Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s
Treatment, supra note 2, at 213; Washburn, Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, supra
note 2, at 780.
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It is from this perspective that I focus the lens of respect on the
work of tribal courts and criminal justice in Indian Country,5 and ulti-
mately oppose any amendment in federal sentencing to count tribal
court convictions to increase federal sentences for Native criminal de-
fendants. A review of the historical diminishment of tribal authority
over crime and punishment on the reservation, as well as the disparate
impact of crime and punishment on Native peoples, leads to a rejec-
tion of counting tribal court convictions in federal sentencing. This
Article proposes an alternative view that both respects Native Ameri-
can individuals caught in the criminal justice system and elevates tri-
bal sovereignty.
I. Towards Respect for Tribal Court Criminal Judgments: A
Prosecutorial View
The current sentencing scheme for federal defendants treats tri-
bal court convictions and foreign country convictions differently than
state and federal convictions. Prior convictions a defendant received
in state and federal court—but not tribal court—are routinely
counted for the purpose of assessing criminal history and ultimately
determining the length of a sentence.6 Counting tribal court convic-
tions would not demonstrate respect for tribal courts or peoples.
Rather, in light of the historical framework of Native American crimi-
nal defendants and the resulting incarceration disparity, such a devia-
tion from the status quo would be harmful. Before presenting the
historical framework and the disparate outcomes for Native criminal
defendants, it is important to explore the place of tribal courts and
recognition of orders in recent scholarship.
A. Introduction to Tribal Courts and Recognition of Orders
Tribal courts are basically unknown entities in the American legal
system. Because people are uneducated or undereducated about tri-
bal court authority and procedures, a misconception and suspicion of
5. The term “Indian Country” is a term of art, defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006),
for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction and interpreted in case law to apply in civil cases.
See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648–49 (1978) (federal trust land was Indian Coun-
try); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 422 U.S. 520, 527 (1998); United States v. Roberts,
185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that an assault occurring in a tribal building held in
trust for Indian tribe was defined as Indian Country for the purposes of federal prosecu-
tion even though not formally declared a reservation).
6. USSG § 4A1.2(i) (“Sentences resulting from tribal court convictions are not
counted, but may be considered under §4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History
Category).”).
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tribal courts and their decisions has developed over time. Uninformed
suspicion has led to a certain defensive response by those working in
tribal courts and tribal communities.
Scholarship in defense of tribal courts has basically taken two
conceptual approaches: (1) tribal courts are different from American
state and federal court models, and these differences are fundamental
to understanding a tribal court system,7 or; (2) tribal courts are essen-
tially the same as the American state and federal court models, trigger-
ing expectations of similar treatment.8
The problem with comparing tribal courts with federal and state
courts, however, is the use of the state and federal court model as the
norm and the legitimate standard. Tribal justice systems are unique to
the sovereign nation. The independence of a tribe means that each
tribe has the sovereign prerogative to design its own justice system.
Once defined, tribal courts lie uniquely outside of the state and fed-
eral court system.9 Tribal justice systems can differ markedly from
tribe to tribe and from state and federal courts in jurisdiction, applica-
ble law, legal process, sentencing authority, and more. Measuring any
tribal court system against a normative standard of federal and state
7. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts, Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M.
L. REV. 225, 225–26, 256 (1994) [hereinafter Valencia-Weber, Innovative Law] (describing
the creative capacity of tribal courts through the use of tribal custom and tradition, “law
produced in tribal . . . courts does not necessarily retain the discrete elements from Anglo-
American legal culture with the same meaning and value as the contributor culture or
jurisprudence”); Robert Yazzie, Life Comes from It: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175, 175 (1994) (“Navajo justice is unique, because it is the product of experience of Nav-
ajo people.”); Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 229, 264–66 (2000) (discussing the “marked differ-
ence[s]” in Anglo-American and tribal courts); Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains,
7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 28 (1997) (comparing and contrasting Anglo-American and
tribal courts).
8. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: A Year in the Life of Twenty Indian
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 294 (1998) (“[S]ome tribal courts operate as
nearly exact replicas of state courts.”); Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 426
(“Though tribal courts and state courts traveled different paths, they reached the same
destination; both courts must today provide most of the protections set forth in the Bill of
Rights.”).
9. Tribal courts are not federal instrumentalities or “inferior [c]ourts” under Article
III of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The power to prosecute
tribal members for crimes is a retained tribal power and not delegated federal authority.
See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978). Nor are tribal courts instru-
ments of the states. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). The term “tribal courts”
encompasses all “Indian court(s)” as defined under 25 U.S.C. § 1301(3), including tradi-
tional and modern tribal courts created through the exercise of sovereign power and self-
government, and Courts of Indian Offenses established by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See
25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100–.209 (2010) (establishing the Courts of Indian Offenses, listing the
currently operating courts, and setting forth application regulations).
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courts presents a false dilemma and discounts the sovereign indepen-
dence and difference among Indian tribes that has proven vital to Na-
tive survival.
In the process of debating the legitimacy and defending the role
of tribal courts, the recognition of tribal court judgments remains
fixed on the horizon. Whether a foreign10 court recognizes or refuses
to recognize a tribal court order is an act of great importance, espe-
cially if the tribal court is viewed as a subordinate in the state and
federal court hierarchy. Thus, a debate within the debate has
emerged: What measure of recognition should be afforded to tribal
courts by foreign courts? The answer has become equated with the
measure of respect for the tribal court itself.
Scholars, academicians, and judges have debated the issue of rec-
ognition of tribal courts and their decisions. The debate has ranged
from whether full faith and credit11 applies to tribal court orders, and
the constitutional support for such recognition or the lack thereof,12
to whether comity13 should be the guiding principle,14 and if so,
10. The word foreign here connotes the state or federal court with jurisdiction
outside of the tribal court; it does not refer to an international court.
11. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applies on its face only to
states and requires each to extend full “Faith and Credit” to one another’s “public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Full faith and credit differs
from comity, which connotes recognition of foreign orders, not as a matter of obligation
but out of deference and mutual respect. See infra note 13.
12. See, e.g., Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Govern-
ments in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90
KY. L.J. 123, 133–34 (2001); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishment of an On-
Reservation Debt and Related Issues in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 355, 358–62 (1998); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State
Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28
GA. L. REV. 365, 367–73 (1994); B.J. Jones, Tribal Considerations in Comity and Full Faith and
Credit Issues, 68 N.D. L. REV. 689, 690 (1992); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal
Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 897–925, 936 (1990); William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts
and “Territories”: Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REV. 219 (1987); Gordon K.
Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397 (1985); John T.
Moshier, Comment, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and
Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801; Note, The Application of Full Faith
and Credit to Indian Nations, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1064 (1978); Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in
the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977).
13. Comity differs from full faith and credit.
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see supra note 11.
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whether principles of domestic or international comity should be ap-
plied.15 Included in the debate is whether symmetry or asymmetry is
appropriate in the cross-border recognition problem,16 and whether
to incorporate tribal courts into the federal court system.17
Underlying the debate is the question of proper placement of
tribes among other sovereigns. All engaged in the discussion are des-
perately trying to discern whether and where tribes “fit” within a fed-
eral/state hierarchy as interpreted through the Constitution. Because
tribal court power does not derive from the Constitution,18 legal argu-
ments that neglect to address the historical difference, or try to mask
the constitutional gap, between tribal and federal or state decisions
fall victim to imperfect analogies, uneven parallels, and haphazard
logic that creates negative impacts in Indian Country. Given the com-
plexity of competing factors involved in recognition of tribal court
judgments, including the development of tribal courts over time, the
perception of tribal nations, and the legitimate exercise of sovereign
powers, this debate will undoubtedly continue into the future.
Recognition of tribal court decisions has become equated with
recognition of sovereignty itself. Through the regulation of the day-to-
day internal affairs of individual tribal members, tribal justice systems
impact the survival of the whole community. Recognition of tribal
court orders implicates tribal power and decision-making authority
over the internal and external workings and affairs of the tribe. Recog-
14. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 12; Jones, supra note 12; Frank Pommersheim, “Our
Federalism” in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts’
Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 128, 144–49 (2000) (describing
the state/federal relationship as “a credo of respect and comity,” that is equally apropos as
a pertinent doctrine to describe and to define the “fit” of tribal courts within the federal
system,” and citing instances of federal courts doctrine and practice in Indian law cases
that depart excessively from this doctrine).
15. See, e.g., Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments:
A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311 (2000).
16. Drawing on terminology borrowed from other disciplines, Indian law scholars
have explored the recognition problem, under the rubric of symmetry and asymmetry.
Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 863
(2000) (identifying “[c]onstitutional full faith and credit [as] the prototypical symmetric
doctrine” and proclaiming himself the principle proponent of the asymmetrical approach,
Laurence advocates the need for a different set of legal principles for states and tribal
courts in determining recognition of the other’s judgments); Robert Laurence, The Bother-
some Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money
Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979 (1995).
17. R. Stephen McNeil, Note, In a Class by Themselves: A Proposal to Incorporate Tribal
Courts into the Federal Court System Without Compromising Their Unique Status as “Domestic Depen-
dent Nations,” 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 283, 311 (2008).
18. See discussion supra note 9.
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nition (or lack of recognition) ultimately affects tribal people and
whole communities, and reflects how the outsider jurisdictions view
tribal authority. In framing the question of recognition in terms of
respect—respect for tribal court power, authority, and autonomy—
recognition becomes synonymous with inherent tribal sovereignty.
In an attempt to bring respect to tribal courts beyond the reserva-
tion border, one scholar asks for recognition of tribal criminal convic-
tions in state and federal courts. Kevin Washburn19 enters the
discussion from the perspective of a “seasoned former Indian country
federal prosecutor.”20 From this perspective, Washburn suggests the
increased recognition of tribal court criminal convictions by foreign
state and federal courts.21 The treatment and effect of internal tribal
court convictions by these foreign courts becomes central to the ques-
tion of tribal court legitimacy.22
Perceiving a problem of respect for tribal courts and tribal court
adjudications, Washburn advocates “counting” tribal court convictions
against Native individuals under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.23
He favors artificially placing tribal court orders within the foreign
state/federal hierarchy as a standard way to elevate and legitimize the
19. Kevin K. Washburn, a former Assistant United States Attorney in Albuquerque
(1997 to 2000), former law professor at the University of Minnesota and University of Ari-
zona, and currently the Dean of the UNM School of Law, is frequently relied upon as a
leading expert in the field of crime and punishment in Indian Country. For example,
Washburn served as a member of the Native American Advisory Group which later issued a
report the report on Native American sentencing disparity under the federal guidelines in
2003. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON NATIVE AMERICAN
SENTENCING ISSUES app. A at 3 (2003) [hereinafter NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP RE-
PORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/2003
1104_Native_American_Advisory_Group_Report.pdf; see infra notes 222, 284.
20. As referred to by friend and former Assistant United States Attorney, Troy Eid. See
Troy Eid, Beyond Oliphant, Strengthening Criminal Justice in Indian Country, 54 FED. LAW. 40,
46 (2007) (referring to Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2).
21. Washburn, Different Kind, supra note 2, at 289 (“State courts should endeavor to
adopt rules that accord with the notion of symmetry” as between tribal criminal and civil
judgments.).
22. Id. at 288–89 (“A state that is willing to respect a tribal court enough to use its
criminal convictions to place a convicted tribal defendant in greater jeopardy in a later
state proceeding ought to be willing to respect the civil judgments by the same tribal
court.”); Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 445 (rejecting the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s decision to treat tribes like foreign nations under the Guidelines as “disrespectful” to
the work that tribes are doing); Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment, supra
note 2, at 213 (concluding that the Sentencing Commission fosters an official policy of
disrespect for tribal courts: “By ignoring tribal sentences, the Guidelines have institutional-
ized a policy of disrespect for tribal courts and the important work that they do addressing
public safety issues in tribal communities.”).
23. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 443–45.
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tribal court.24 In a series of articles, Washburn takes the position that
respect for tribal court decisions is measured by the deference af-
forded by the foreign power to the tribal court decisions in criminal
matters.25
The proposal to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to “re-
flect the principle that misdemeanor convictions from tribal courts
are entitled to the same level of respect as misdemeanor convictions
from state, county and municipal courts”26 begins with a comparison
between tribal courts and state courts in order to establish legitimacy
of the former.27 According to Washburn, treating tribal court convic-
tions and sentences the same as state convictions under the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines is proper because tribal court sentences are entitled to
at least the same respect as state court sentences.28 Thus, he has called
for the Sentencing Commission to “abolish Section 4A1.2(i), which
prevents tribal court sentences from being used in the routine calcula-
tion of criminal histories.”29
This Article seeks to create a more nuanced view of the meaning
of “respect” when applied to the concept of tribal sovereignty and tri-
bal court decisions. In scholarship and colloquial usage, the words “re-
spect” and “recognition” are used interchangeably to describe the
proper credit that a foreign court should afford a tribal court order,
and evaluate legitimacy or esteem reflected in tribal authority.
The goal of this Article is to unpack Washburn’s overly simplistic
view of respect, and to challenge his notion of increased “respect” for
tribal courts through lengthening the federal sentences of individual
24. Id. at 450 (calling for the abolishment of the current Guidelines’ treatment of
tribal court orders of conviction).
25. Washburn, Different Kind, supra note 2, at 279 (“In the civil context, state ap-
proaches to recognition of tribal judgments can be plotted on a spectrum from highly
respectful to relatively ambivalent to not respectful at all.”); id. (demonstrating some states
treat tribal court judgments “in the same manner as the state’s own” that is with great
assumed respect); Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 420 (“[T]reating tribal courts
like foreign courts may reflect something other than respect for tribal sovereignty.”); id. at
442 (“[T]he implication of the guidelines [in not counting tribal convictions] is that tribal
courts lack legitimacy.”); Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment, supra note 2, at
213 (“The Commission should change its tribal courts policy and recognize that the
sentences of tribal courts are entitled to the same respect as state court sentences in the
federal sentencing regime.”); Washburn, Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, supra
note 2, at 780.
26. Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment, supra note 2, at 209.
27. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 421–28.
28. Id. at 450 (“The Commission should change its tribal courts policy and recognize
that the sentences of tribal courts are entitled to the same respect as state courts sentences
in the federal sentencing regime.”).
29. Id.
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Indian defendants. Washburn’s articles are briefly summarized and
critiqued below.
B. Summary of Washburn Articles
In A Different Kind of Symmetry, Washburn proposes a mirror image
or reflexive symmetry for tribal civil and criminal judgments within a
state’s jurisdiction.30 The article ultimately advocates for states to
adopt a fully symmetrical approach to the treatment of both tribal
criminal and civil decisions.31 If a state recognizes tribal court convic-
tions, the same state should provide symmetrical treatment of civil ad-
judications and vice-versa.32 Despite serious negative ramifications of
recognition of tribal criminal convictions upon individual Indians,
Washburn concludes that it is entirely appropriate for states to “re-
spect” the criminal convictions of tribal courts because tribal courts
are “very much like the state and federal court systems.”33 After calling
for reflexive symmetry between civil and criminal judgments, with
only minimal attention to important differences between the two
types of determinations,34 he ventures a step further in a second arti-
cle, directing attention to the recognition of tribal court convictions
in federal court sentencing.35
Building on the idea that tribal courts deserve respect through
recognition, in Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing,36 Washburn argues
that tribal court convictions should be taken into account when calcu-
lating37 the length of a Native American defendant’s sentence under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.38 The subject of the article is
USSG Rule 4A1.2(i), the rule that specifically exempts tribal court
convictions in the calculation of a defendant’s criminal history for fed-
eral sentencing purposes.39 The article admonishes the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, the body created in 1987 with the express
responsibility of drafting the Sentencing Guidelines, for leaving tribal
30. Washburn, Different Kind, supra note 2, at 288–89.
31. Id. at 285–88.
32. Id. at 288–89.
33. Id. at 288.
34. Id. at 272–78.
35. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2.
36. Id.
37. The word calculate refers to the method of determining a criminal sentence in
federal court by counting prior convictions and ascribing each conviction criminal history
points under the elaborate set of rules laid out in the United States Sentencing Guideline
Manual. See infra Part II.B.
38. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 450.
39. Id. at 406, 415–17.
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court convictions out of the calculation for an Indian defendant’s
prior criminal history.40 Washburn rejects the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s treatment of tribal court convictions as a failure to recognize
tribal courts.41 He views the decision not to count tribal criminal con-
victions and sentences in calculating the length of a federal sentence
as inconsistent with general federal policy upholding and supporting
tribal self-governance.42 Equating the exemption of tribal convictions
with a level of disrespect, Washburn writes, “unlike state courts, whose
convictions and sentences are given due respect by the United States
Sentencing Commission . . . in sentencing for subsequent federal of-
fenses, past offenses adjudicated by tribal courts are ignored in the
federal sentencing process.”43
Importantly, the lack of a right to counsel for the Indian defen-
dant is raised, and dispensed with here. In finding that tribal courts
are more like state courts than they are like foreign courts for the
purposes of federal sentencing,44 Washburn argues that tribal courts
are, for the most part, subject to the same substantive and procedural
due process requirements as state courts.45 In support of this conclu-
sion, he points to the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”),46 and notes
that ICRA incorporates “virtually identical” protections as compared
with the fundamental rights and responsibilities conferred on the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.47
Acknowledging the lack of a right to appointed counsel for those
who cannot afford to hire an attorney, Washburn nevertheless argues
that “the modus operandi of tribal courts is not fundamentally differ-
ent than that of state courts.”48 Although the lack of indigent defense
counsel in tribal courts is a “serious flaw,” Washburn counters that this
flaw should “not prohibit counting of tribal courts [sic] sentences in
the federal sentencing context.”49 He advocates amending the Sen-
tencing Guidelines to require federal courts to routinely recognize tri-
40. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 416.
41. Id. at 415–18.
42. Id. at 435–39.
43. Id. at 406–07.
44. Id. at 421–28.
45. Id. at 428–35.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 426.
48. Id. at 426, 429–30.
49. Id. at 430.
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bal criminal convictions when sentencing Native people for crimes
committed in Indian Country.50
In a third article, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment of Tribal
Courts, Washburn continues to equate counting tribal court convic-
tions with a form of respect.51 He argues that “in refusing to count
tribal convictions for purposes of routine calculation of criminal his-
tory, the [Sentencing] Commission has disrespected tribal courts.”52
As a cure for the disrespect shown tribal courts, Washburn recom-
mends counting an Indian defendant’s prior tribal court convictions
in calculating the defendant’s federal sentence.53 He views the Sen-
tencing Commission’s treatment of tribal courts as “impossible to rec-
oncile with other modern federal polices of respect for tribal self-
determination and self-governance.”54 Reasoning that the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission should afford tribal courts and their sentences at
least the same “respect” in the federal sentencing scheme as it does
those of state courts, he labels the policy decision “not to credit the
legitimate work of tribal courts” as “indefensible.”55 Measuring tribal
courts against a state court standard and finding that tribes are more
like states than foreign nations, Washburn takes issue with the exemp-
tion56 and pointedly directs the Sentencing Commission to change
the rule.57 He advocates honoring tribal court convictions to effec-
50. Id. at 445–50 (“In keeping with the analysis herein, the Commission should first
abolish Section 4A1.2(i), which prevents tribal court sentences from being used in the
routine calculation of criminal histories.”).
51. Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment, supra note 2. Washburn ex-
plained that Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment was published in 2005 as the third arti-
cle but written prior to his Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, which was published in 2004.
Conversation with Kevin K. Washburn, in Albuquerque, N.M., (March 7, 2010).
52. Id. at 209.
53. Id. at 209, 213.
54. Id. at 209.
55. Id. at 213 (“By ignoring tribal sentences, the Guidelines have institutionalized a
policy of disrespect for tribal courts and the important work that they do addressing public
safety issues in tribal communities. . . . [T]he Commission’s decision not to credit the
legitimate work of tribal courts in adjudicating misdemeanor sentences is indefensible.”).
56. Id. at 212 (“The Commission should recognize that tribal courts are substantially
more like state courts than foreign courts and should accord tribal courts the same respect
that they receive from the rest of the federal government.”).
57. Id. at 213 (“The Commission should reconsider Section 4A1.2(i) which prevents
tribal court sentences from being used in the routine calculation of criminal histories. The
Commission should change its tribal courts policy and recognize that the sentences of
tribal courts are entitled to the same respect as state court sentences in the federal sentenc-
ing regime.”).
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tively increase the federal prison sentences of Native American
defendants.58
In Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-determination,59 Washburn
continues to define respect for tribal court convictions in terms of
recognition of the conviction in federal sentencing.60 The article be-
gins with an in depth view of “the history and doctrinal foundations of
the Major Crimes Act, tracing the historical context of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction leading up to its enactment.”61 Placing the Major
Crimes Act in the broader context of Indian law and policy, Washburn
decries the Act’s original purposes of increasing federal control and
assimilation of the Indian as lacking legitimacy in the modern era of
tribal self-determination.62 He finds that the displacement of tribal ju-
risdiction and imposition of outside norms have denied tribes an im-
portant expression of self-determination and self-definition in their
own tribal justice systems.63
Unfortunately, immersion in the historical context of federal en-
croachment on Indian criminal justice and jurisdiction does not dis-
suade Washburn from the position espoused in the earlier set of
articles—namely that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be
changed to count prior tribal convictions to lengthen an Indian’s sen-
tence in a subsequent federal criminal proceeding.64 Instead, he
clings to the idea and reiterates the point that the current federal sen-
tencing scheme is the problem:
[A]s explained in greater detail in another article, the federal sen-
tencing guidelines require federal judges to count state and federal
criminal convictions to assess an Indian offender’s criminal history
for purposes of determining the severity of a federal sentence. Yet,
federal judges are instructed to ignore convictions rendered by the
Indian offender’s own tribal courts.65
He denounces the federal sentencing scheme as contrary to the
accepted norm, asserting, “from the normative viewpoint presented
here, the federal sentencing guidelines are not only wrong, but also
perverse.”66 Again, Washburn places the counting of convictions
58. Id.
59. Washburn, Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, supra note 2.
60. Id. at 840 (“Thus tribal convictions ought to be treated with greater respect than
state and federal convictions, not less.”).
61. Id. at 790–806.
62. Id. at 779–80.
63. Id. at 837–42.
64. Id. at 840.
65. Id. at 840 n.329 (citing his 2004 article, Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2).
66. Id.
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against Indian individuals as indicative of the legitimacy and respect
of their issuing courts:
For reasons previously articulated, the convictions rendered by a
tribal court in the offender’s own community would seem to have
far greater legitimacy than federal convictions levied under the
laws of an external community. Thus, tribal convictions ought to
be treated with greater respect than state and federal convictions,
not less.67
Overall, Washburn argues that the current status of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which fails to treat tribes and tribal court judg-
ments as those of the states for the purpose of sentencing, is inconsis-
tent with current federal polices in favor of tribal self-governance,68
out of step with the explicit goals of the Sentencing Guidelines to
bring honesty, proportionality, and equality to federal sentences,69
and fails to mete out justice in Indian Country.70 Since courts, in gen-
eral, serve as the primary instruments of criminal justice for a commu-
nity, the concern is that excluding tribal court convictions in federal
sentencing conveys a “demoralizing message”71 that states and cities
are entitled to respect, but tribal courts and communities are not.72
According to Washburn, the Sentencing Commission’s exclusion of
tribal court convictions “at best” sends the “paternalistic and demean-
ing” message that “tribal courts may be lawful but they are not rele-
vant in federal Indian country criminal justice,” and “[a]t worst, the
implication of the guidelines is that tribal courts lack legitimacy.”73
C. Commentary on the Proposal to Count Tribal Court
Convictions
Interestingly, this radical and recurrent proposal to change the
Sentencing Guidelines to count tribal convictions provoked no com-
ments from tribal courts, tribal governments, or tribal people. The
first two Washburn articles described above generated no direct re-
sponse. However, the third article, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treat-
ment of Tribal Courts, was published along with brief commentary from
the bench and bar on the wisdom of “counting” tribal convictions in
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 445; Washburn, Reconsidering the Commis-
sion’s Treatment, supra note 2, at 211.
69. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 439–40 (tracking the language of 28
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) defining the purpose of the Sentencing Commission).
70. Id. at 447–50.
71. Id. at 442.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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the same manner that state convictions are incorporated into the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines.74 In his Commentary, Judge William C.
Canby,75 Senior Court Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
agreed with the “major proposition” that there exists “a clear inconsis-
tency between the federal Indian law policies supporting the authority
and dignity of the tribal courts and the Sentencing Commission’s
Guideline § 4A1.2(i),” and viewed the proposal as a way to address the
severe law enforcement problem in Indian Country.76 Judge Canby,
however, recognized the undeniable negative impact of the proposal,
providing:
Because the federal government plays such a large role in Indian
country law enforcement, the effect of counting tribal convictions
in criminal history will be to subject Indian offenders to increas-
ingly harsh sentences that may not apply to the comparable non-
Indian offender whose case is handled by the state courts.77
This harsh treatment of Natives under the Sentencing Guidelines
appropriately caused Judge Canby to question “whether according full
dignity to tribal courts is worth the cost of increasing the severity of
sentences to offenders with tribal court criminal histories.”78 Accord-
ing to Canby, Washburn sufficiently makes the case that it is worth the
cost because of the severe law enforcement problems faced by many
tribes.79
The federal defender Commentary recognized the “real conse-
quence of such counting would be longer sentences” for Native Amer-
icans.80 The defenders opposed the proposal to treat tribal sentences
like state sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines as unnecessary
74. Jon M. Sands & Jane L. McClellan, Commentary: Policy Meets Practice: Why Tribal
Court Convictions Should Not Be Counted, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 215, 215–18 (2005); Bruce D.
Black, Commentary on Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 FED.
SENT’G REP. 218, 218 (2005); Charles Kornmann, Commentary on Reconsidering the Com-
mission’s Treatment of Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 222 (2005); William C.
Canby, Jr., Commentary: Treatment of Tribal Court Convictions, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 220,
220–21 (2005).
75. Judge Canby disclosed that Washburn was his judicial law clerk from 1993 to 1994.
Canby, supra note 74, at 221 n.1.




80. Sands & McClellan, supra note 74, at 216 (“The Proposal Would Drastically
Lengthen Sentences.”). The authors noted that they served along with Washburn on the
Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Native American Sentencing Issues and Indian Crime that
recognized a sentencing disparity for Natives. Id. at 217 n.4.
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to accurately assess criminal history for Indians in federal cases,81 and
questioned the existence and adequacy of due process in tribal
courts.82 In support of the status quo, the federal defender Commen-
tary pointed out the marked differences among tribal justice sys-
tems.83 Recognizing that “tribes, through their tribal courts, are
seeking to implement tribal values and cultures,” the federal defender
Commentary acknowledged that tribal systems may seek to perform
different functions for the tribal community than state courts provide
for their citizenry.84 According to the Commentary, “[w]hile it is laud-
able that the tribes are resolving criminal matters differently than the
states, it is all the more reason to treat the convictions differently”
under the federal Sentencing Guidelines.85
Also rejecting the proposal to count tribal court convictions in
federal sentencing, Judge Charles Kornmann provides the most suc-
cinct assessment:
The guidelines already act in a racist manner. Indians are sub-
jected to very harsh penalties in federal court. A non-Native Ameri-
can sentenced in state court for a comparable crime will receive a
much shorter sentence and qualify for parole. Congress almost
routinely makes everything a federal crime, thus continuing to
“pile it on” in Indian Country.
I simply cannot favor anything that mandates further in-
creases in the length of sentences for Native Americans.86
81. See id. at 215 (discussing the adequacy of the current rules in the section titled “If
It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It”).
82. Id. at 216 (citations omitted in original). The Commentary mostly denigrates tri-
bal courts, providing the following description:
While undoubtedly there are many tribes that have sophisticated court systems,
the fact is that many, if not most, do not. Even in the tribal court systems which
Professor Washburn points to, such as the Navajo Nation’s criminal justice system,
neither judges nor prosecutors nor defense counsel are required to be lawyers.
Frequently the defendant is unrepresented, and is not afforded the same constitu-
tional rights that defendants are given as a matter of course “off the reservation.”
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina, tribal courts
do not afford the same level of protection and rights as state jurisdictions.
Id. (citations omitted in original).
83. Id. at 217 (“The varieties of criminal justice systems are remarkable. Some large
tribes have extensive tribal criminal justice systems while other small tribes may have rudi-
mentary or nonexistent criminal justice systems.”).
84. Id. at 216 (“[C]oncepts of community responsibility, duty and even religious obli-
gation . . . differ from the aims of federal and state prosecutions, which focus on punish-
ment and deterrence.”).
85. Id. at 216.
86. Kornmann, supra note 74, at 222.
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II. Anatomy of Respect: Unraveling the Meaning of Respect
for Tribal Court Criminal Convictions in the Context
of Crime and Punishment of Indians
in Federal Court
Washburn is not the only scholar to describe issues of Indian
identity and sovereignty in terms of respect. Although the term is
often used in scholarship, it is rarely defined.87 Instead, the word “re-
spect” is commonly accepted to connote vague and complex concepts
from regard or consideration to esteem and high honor or admira-
tion. An operational definition of such an important word is indispen-
sable to a thorough understanding of the powers given, and duties
and actions owed to, and withheld from, tribes and tribal courts.
In philosophical terms, philosophy professor Stephen Darwall
identified two different kinds of respect applicable to persons: “recog-
nition respect” and “appraisal respect.”88 Recognition respect refers to
the acknowledgement that an individual is a separate, unique, free,
and independent human being.89 Under this form of respect, no ad-
miration is required. Recognition respect is based upon the idea that
proper consideration or weight to persons, as persons, is owed to all.90
In contrast, appraisal respect is not owed to all persons but is offered
87. See, e.g., Korey Wahwassuck, John P. Smith & John R. Hawkinson, Building a Legacy
of Hope: Perspectives on Joint Tribal-State Jurisdictions, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 859, 876
(2010) (“The period of Indian Reorganization (1928–1942) marked a transition to in-
creased tolerance and respect for traditional Indian culture.”); Steven J. Gunn, The Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act at Twenty: Reaching the Limits of our National
Consensus, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2010) (describing the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 25. U.S.C. §§ 3001–3010 (2006) in terms
of impact: “It has led, more often than not, to greater communication and collaboration
between museums, scientists, and American Indians, and to a heightened respect for the
sanctity of Indian art, cultural property, and human remains.”); Gloria Valencia-Weber &
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Stories in Mexico and the United States About the Border: The Rhetoric
and the Realities, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241, 309 (2010) (“Respect for tribes’
authority to define their membership to continue their culturally distinct way of life should
be manifested in how U.S. procedures at its southern border actually operate.”); Ezra
Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L. 437, 472–73 (2010)
(“Avoiding environmental paternalism requires expanding the understanding of environ-
mental justice to include respect for sovereignty when it comes to Indians.”).
88. See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 38 (1977) [hereinafter
Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect]; see also Stephen L. Darwall, Kant on Respect, Dignity and the
Duty of Respect, in KANT’S ETHICS OF VIRTUE 179 (Monika Betzler ed., 2008).
89. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, supra note 88, at 38, 45–47.
90. Id. at 38 (“To say that persons as such are entitled to respect is to say that they are
entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that they are
persons in deliberating about what to do.”).
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only in recognition of excellence.91 In this sense, respect is a verb,
meaning to treat with honor, high-esteem, and admiration.92 Adapt-
ing Darwall’s two different kinds of respect to address tribes and tribal
courts reveals an inherent ambiguity and inconsistency in Washburn’s
use of the word respect as it pertains to the treatment of tribal courts
as state courts under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Reduced to its syllogistic components, the idea of respect for
prior state convictions and disrespect for tribal convictions is simple.
Two syllogisms emerge to form the basis of Washburn’s respect
equation:
First syllogism: Federal courts count prior criminal convictions of
state courts. Tribal courts are “very much like” state courts.93 There-
fore, federal courts should count tribal court criminal convictions.
Second syllogism: A criminal conviction is respected, if and only
if it is counted as a prior court conviction in the federal sentencing
scheme. The Sentencing Commission does not count tribal court con-
victions. Therefore, the Commission does not respect tribal court
decisions.
At first glance this “recognition means respect” equation and its
converse “respect requires recognition” make sense. If the extension
of comity or full faith and credit to tribal judgments is the same as
recognizing tribes as sovereign and independent, then recognizing
the decisions of tribal nations is appropriate. By using Darwall’s two
kinds of respect, however, Washburn confuses recognition respect
with appraisal respect by equating the counting of tribal court convic-
tions with elevation or legitimacy of the issuing courts.94
As discussed below, a myriad of problems emanate from the the-
sis presented in Washburn’s proposal of symmetry, which is to either
treat tribal criminal convictions as civil judgments within a state or
treat them the same as state convictions in federal sentencing, in or-
der to gain respect. First, the proposed symmetry in criminal adjudica-
tions is not true symmetry. Tribal courts and state courts do not share
a symmetrical jurisdiction. Nor do they share a history.
The history of displacement of tribal criminal justice and the im-
position of federal criminal laws, discussed in Parts II.A. and II.B. be-
low,95 includes the evolution of disrespect. Congressional action,
91. Id.
92. Id. at 38–39.
93. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 426.
94. See supra Part I.
95. See infra Part II.A–B.
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executive agency policy and rules, and Supreme Court decisions failed
in Darwall’s first kind of respect—recognition respect. The federal
government and courts failed to recognize tribes’ unique sovereign
capacity to address crime within the exterior boundaries of the reser-
vation. The disrespect began with the enactment of the Major Crimes
Act, which required federal prosecution of serious crimes in Indian
Country.96 The Major Crimes Act repudiated the Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-
ka decision, which had acknowledged tribes’ local authority to admin-
ister traditional justice, and found that federal courts had no jurisdic-
tion over crimes by Indians in Indian Country.97 After Ex parte Kan-gi-
shun-ka, the disrespect developed over time, blow-by-blow, beginning
with the creation of Courts of Indian Offenses98 in 1883, which re-
sulted in displacement of traditional justice systems. As explained be-
low, these courts imposed western concepts and courts on Indian
Country, where there was thought to be no internal justice. The disre-
spect continued to deepen, from the enactment of the Major Crimes
Act to the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish,99 result-
ing in the current landscape in Indian Country criminal justice where
federal courts have jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by Na-
tive Americans on the reservation, yet tribal courts have no jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed by non-Indians on the reservation.100
Part II.C. addresses the asymmetrical impact of the proposed re-
spect of tribal court convictions as between Indian defendants and
non-Indian defendants. As dual citizens, Native Americans are subject
to successive prosecution in tribal court and federal court for the
same conduct. Because double jeopardy does not attach, the federal
system does not recognize tribal prosecution and sentencing in prose-
cuting the same conduct or mitigating the federal sentence.101 The
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
97. Ex parte Crow Dog (Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka), 109 U.S. 556, 569, 571 (1883). The
Supreme Court noted the English name Crow Dog in the title of the case.
98. A current list of Courts of Indian Offenses are found in the Code of Federal Regu-
lations at 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2010). These courts, distinct from other tribal courts or tradi-
tional justice systems, and are also known as “C.F.R.” courts in reference to these governing
procedures.
99. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see discussion infra Part
I.A.4.
100. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006)) (congressional act denigrating and diminishing tribal criminal jurisdiction by re-
moving jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by Indians to federal court); Oliphant,
435 U.S. 191 (denying inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and inventing
the doctrine of implied limits on tribal powers).
101. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that federal prosecu-
tion for rape of a Navajo Tribal member did not violate double jeopardy prohibition even
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proposed change in the Sentencing Guidelines would only exacerbate
the existing disparity faced by individual Native American defendants
in federal court and the tribal community at large.102 By adding more
tribal criminal convictions to the sentencing calculation, Tribal de-
fendants will be subject to even longer sentences.
As pointed out in the brief Commentary on the proposal, from
only a few invited judges and a single federal defender, discussed
above103 and explained in greater detail below,104 in terms of direct
costs, Indians are overrepresented as defendants in federal court and
in federal prison and face disproportionately longer prison
sentences.105 In terms of collateral consequences, Native communi-
ties, families, and juveniles are all impacted by the stigmatic and prac-
tical impacts of incarceration.106 Native families are placed in a cycle
of over-incarceration. For example, children with a parent in jail are
more likely to be incarcerated themselves.107 Native juveniles are
brought into the criminal justice system at higher rates.108 Under the
Major Crimes Act, Native American juveniles face federal prosecution
instead of juvenile court adjudication, and thus far graver conse-
quences than those proceeding in state court.109
though the defendant had already been tried and convicted in tribal court based on the
same incident, because of the separate sovereigns doctrine (tribal and federal courts being
the two separate sovereigns).
102. See discussion infra Part II.C.
103. See discussion supra Part I.C.
104. See discussion infra Part II.C.
105. See TODD MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN:
JAILS IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2008, at 1–2 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/jic08.pdf. In 2008, “[t]he incarceration rate for American Indians was about
21% higher than the overall national incarceration rate of 759 per 100,000 persons other
than American Indians or Alaska Natives . . . . Between 2000 and 2008, the number of
American Indians confined in jails and prisons nationwide grew on average by about 4.4%
annually.” Id.; see also infra Part II.C.
106. See generally John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment
for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121 (1999) (discussing the collat-
eral effects of incarceration on individuals and their communities).
107. See, e.g., CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, CAL. RES. BUREAU, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
PARENTS 6 (2000), available at www.library.ca.gov/crb/00/notes/v7n2.pdf (citing Califor-
nia statistics finding that: “Children of offenders are five times more likely than their peers
to end up in prison themselves. One in 10 will have been incarcerated before reaching
adulthood.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108. See discussion infra Part II.C.
109. Because there is no separate federal system for juveniles, children who commit
major crimes in Indian Country are also subject to federal court prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). See United States v. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. 1406, 1407–08
(D.N.M. 1996) (finding Native American Juveniles face disproportionately longer
sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines, citing cases and listing reports and studies);
Amy J. Standefer, Note, The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act: A Disparate Impact on Native
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Finally, treating all tribes and tribal justice systems as if they were
the same to achieve uniformity in federal sentencing fails to respect
the fullness of difference owned by each tribal community. Respect in
this context means acknowledging and understanding that tribes and
tribal justice systems are different from state and federal entities and
are different from each other. A proposal to count all tribal court con-
victions (like all state court convictions) does not effectively differenti-
ate among tribes and their justice systems. Instead, such a proposal is
grounded in the misguided assumption that all tribal courts operate
as images of state and federal models. Thus, the first syllogism—that
federal courts should count tribal convictions because all tribal courts
are “very much like” state courts—can also be characterized as reflect-
ing a normative component and qualitative standard imposed by out-
sider courts.
Federal policies—designed to terminate or assimilate tribal gov-
ernments and tribal people—displaced tribal justice systems and pres-
sured tribal governments into importing foreign concepts of justice
and process in order elevate or legitimize the justice systems in Indian
Country, which were seen as savage.110 A competing internal pressure
exists to produce traditional justice systems reflective of internal tribal
norms, traditions, and values.111 This pressure creates differences in
the internal workings of tribal courts and due process among tribes,
and yet results in assimilative tribal court systems with concomitant
gaps in structure or process.112
The proper recognition and respect owed to tribal court deci-
sions in the criminal context cannot be understood without a review
of historical underpinnings and a brief history of crime and jurisdic-
tion to punish. In addition, a review of the federal framework for sen-
tencing Native Americans in federal court is necessary to understand
the negative disparate impact. This history and the concomitant dis-
parity refute the argument that respect for tribes comes from recog-
nizing tribal court sentences. Each is thoroughly discussed below.
American Juveniles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 473, 483, 495–500 (1999) (describing the negative
impact of federal jurisdiction and concomitant federal sentencing).
110. Ex parte Crow Dog (Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka), 109 U.S. 556, 569, 571 (1883). The
Supreme Court noted the English name Crow Dog in the title of the case (referring to a
“savage tribe,” “savage life,” and “savage nature” in reference to the Sioux Tribe and Na-
tives in general and Crow Dog, in particular).
111. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, Innovative Law, supra note 7 (describing the legitimacy of
tribal courts and the use of tribal customary law, as viewed by foreign courts).
112. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts: Providers of Justice and Protectors of Sovereignty,
79 JUDICATURE 110, 111 (1995) (discussing the two-fold challenge of maintaining credibil-
ity and legitimacy).
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A. A Brief History of Criminal Law in Indian Country
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country has been aptly called a
complex “jurisdictional maze.”113 Dual federal and tribal sovereignty
to prosecute Indians within Indian Country requires Indian law practi-
tioners to refer to a familiar, but nevertheless complex and confusing,
chart or matrix to sort out: (1) which sovereign may prosecute in a
particular case given the identity variables of the site, the perpetrator,
and the victim; (2) whether that prosecutorial power is partial or com-
plete; (3) whether the prosecutorial power is exclusive or concurrent;
and (4) whether that power is inherent or conferred by the other
sovereign.114
Tribal power to govern the people within the territory predates
the U.S. Constitution.115 Prior to the United States’ assertion of juris-
diction over Indians, tribal power to govern within its recognized
boundaries was established.116 Although there could be physical strug-
gles related to the power externally, the terms were determined within
and among the tribes.117 Tribes followed indigenous ways of knowing,
113. See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976) (credited with coining the term in his
“second in a series of three articles surveying the jurisdictional maze surrounding the
problems of law enforcement on Indian lands” to describe the rules of tribal criminal juris-
diction developed piecemeal over a span of 200 years); see also Robert N. Clinton, Develop-
ment of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951
(1975). The promised and much-anticipated third article suggesting reform in this area
has not yet emerged.
114. Such a chart is reprinted in WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 199–200 (5th ed. 2009). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEYS’ MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 689, available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00689.htm; Timothy J. Droske, Cor-
recting Native American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 737–39
(2008).
115. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1896) (“It cannot be doubted . . . that prior to
the formation of the Constitution treaties were made with the Cherokee tribes by which
their autonomous existence was recognized.”).
116. Tribal law and power constitutes the internal law of a tribe as distinguished from
federal Indian law, which consists of treaties, statutes, and common law governing the fed-
eral government’s relationship with tribes and the states. See Treaty of Hopewell with the
Choctaw Nation art. IV, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21; see also Treaty of Hopewell with the Chicka-
saw Nation art. IV-V, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24; Treaty on the Great Miami with the Shawnee
art. VII, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26; Treaty of Fort Harmar with the Wyandot Nation and
Other Tribes art. IX, Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28; Treaty of New York with the Creek Nation art.
VI, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35; Treaty of Holston with the Cherokee Nation art. VIII, July 2,
1791, 7 Stat. 39; Treaty of Greenville with the Wyandots and Other Tribes art. VII, Aug. 3,
1795, 7 Stat. 49.
117. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL
LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10 (1994) (citing works of tradi-
tional law of Indian people).
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including their own legal traditions and “systems” reflecting tribal val-
ues and norms.118 In his book, Crow Dog’s Case, Sidney L. Harring de-
scribes the federal treatment of indigenous legal tradition:
The Indian tribes had their own laws, evolved through generations
of living together, to solve the ordinary problems of social conflict.
This legal tradition is very rich, reflecting the great diversity of In-
dian peoples in North America. Yet this law was seldom analyzed in
U.S. [federal] Indian law, even when it was recognized. When it
was discussed, as in Crow Dog, i[t] was often treated contemptu-
ously, dismissed there as “a case of Red man’s revenge,” a racist
and false description of Sioux law.119
Although acknowledged explicitly in treaties and implicitly in
concepts of tribal self-governance, self-determination, and sover-
eignty, tribal legal tradition was not incorporated into the federal laws
governing relations with Indian tribes.120
1. Beyond the Marshall Trilogy: The Courts and Congress on
Crime in Indian Country
In any overview of Indian law, federal Indian law scholars typically
skip indigenous legal tradition or internal tribal “law” and begin with
the Marshall Trilogy121—three cases decided by the Supreme Court in
118. For explications on tradition law in legal scholarship, see Pat Sekaquaptewa, Key
Concepts in the Finding, Definition and Consideration of Custom Law in Tribal Lawmaking, 32 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 319 (2008) (Hopi customary law); Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indige-
nous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness: [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tri-
bal Law, TRIBAL L.J. (2000) [hereinafter Zuni Cruz, Customs and Traditions], available at
http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/content.php (explor-
ing adoption of tribal law that reflects indigenous traditional law and values); Robert B.
Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal
Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1997) (describing
traditional Seneca dispute resolution and other traditional Native dispute resolution mech-
anisms); Yazzie, supra note 7 (“Navajo justice is unique, because it is the product of experi-
ence of Navajo people.”); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126 (1995); Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, The Navajo Justice and Har-
mony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993).
119. HARRING, supra note 117, at 10 (citing works of traditional law of Indian people).
120. See, e.g., id. at 292 (“[T]his rich legal tradition does not exist because it was recog-
nized by the courts, . . . but rather because the tribes never ceased to act as sovereign
peoples and never gave up their ‘old law.’”).
121. The Marshall Trilogy refers to “the three famous opinions of Chief Justice John
Marshall that expounded for the first time in the halls of the United States Supreme Court
the bases for federal Indian common law.” Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the
Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 627 (2006). The cases are: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 US
(8 Wheat) 543 (1823) (introducing the Doctrine of Discovery into federal Indian law, and
finding that Indians retained rights in the lands they occupied, but limiting those rights by
prohibiting alienation of such land to non-Indians); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (finding Indian tribes not a “foreign state” as that term is defined by
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the early years of the 19th century. These cases provide an introduc-
tion to the federal view of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, and
without exception, they are touted as the foundational precedent in a
chain of case law describing and developing federal power over Indian
tribes.
Before the Supreme Court decided those cases in the 1830s, the
delegation of authority to prosecute criminal offenses in certain terri-
tories was governed by treaty,122 or trade and intercourse acts de-
signed to allow for lawful trade with tribal nations.123 The General
Crimes Act,124 enacted in 1817, provided for federal court jurisdiction
over interracial crimes committed in Indian Country, but protected
the tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction over Indian offenses in Indian Coun-
try “under the local law of the tribes” or by treaty stipulation.125 Over
time, Congress and the Supreme Court’s concerted efforts limited in-
herent tribal sovereignty in legitimate tribal internal criminal matters
Article III, section 2, paragraph 1 of the Constitution for jurisdictional purposes, and in-
stead characterizing tribes as “domestic, dependent nations,” and comparing the tribes’
relationships to the United States as that of a “ward to his guardian”); and Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557, 561 (1832) (describing the “Indian nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclu-
sive,” and within those boundaries, the laws of the state can have no force). Fletcher credits
Charles Wilkinson with first describing these seminal cases as a trilogy in CHARLES F. WIL-
KINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW, NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 24 (1987); see Fletcher, supra, at 627 n.2.
122. Treaties between the United States and the tribal nations were nation-to-nation
documents and some included recognition of tribal power within the confines of the reser-
vation to govern the community through tribal values, norms, and forms of justice. This
recognition was based on the tribes themselves living, working, and warring and resolving
issues within the tribe, and with other tribes. The treaty era of federal Indian policy for-
mally ended in 1871. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (2006)).
123. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 was one of the first Acts of Con-
gress. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). Replaced and amended over time, it is now codified at 25
U.S.C. § 177.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The General Crimes Act is also referred to as the “Indian Coun-
try Crimes Act.” See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.02[1] (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005).
125. The General Crimes Act provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except in the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian Country. This section shall not extend to offenses com-
mitted by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any
Indian committing any offense in the Indian Country who has been punished by
the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively.
19 U.S.C. § 1152.
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on the reservation.126 The pressure to assimilate and the pressure to
produce traditional justice systems that reflected external federal and
state court norms is apparent in the history of crime and punishment,
and that legacy is evident today.
2. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka and the Major Crimes Act
The much-examined case of Ex parte Crow Dog (otherwise known
as Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka)127 illustrates a tribal restorative justice rem-
edy in the criminal context. During the 1880s and the period preced-
ing the Crow Dog prosecution, the murder of an Indian by an Indian
in the Dakota Territory of Indian Country was treated exclusively
under tribal traditional law.128 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka, decided in
1881, involved a murder on the Great Sioux Reservation in Dakota
Territory in which Kan-gi-shun-ka, or Crow Dog in English, a Brule
Sioux Indian, shot and killed Sin-ta-ga-le-Skca, or Spotted Tail in En-
glish, a Brule Sioux chief.129 Crow Dog was brought to justice under
Sioux tradition. Under the Brule tradition, the tribal council met to
resolve the murder, order an end to the disturbance, and arrange a
peaceful reconciliation of the families involved through offered or or-
dered gifts.130 For the murder, Crow Dog’s family was ordered to com-
pensate Spotted Tail’s family by offering $600, eight horses, and one
blanket under tribal traditional “law.”131
After the Brule settled the matter under local tribal authority,
Crow Dog was arrested two days after the murder to be tried in the
federal territorial court.132 The United States then convicted Crow
126. See, e.g., id. § 1153 (congressional diminishment of tribal criminal jurisdiction by
removing jurisdiction over serious crimes to federal court.); Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Tit. II–VII, §§ 201–701, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341) (imposing a version of the Bill of Rights on Tribal governments);
Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (divesting tribes of tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indians in criminal cases); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (diminishing
tribal court jurisdiction over non-members in civil tort actions); see also Angela Riley, (Tri-
bal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 827 (2007) (“Although the treaty rela-
tionship, the federal Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and congressional action
have worked together to repeatedly reaffirm the inherent sovereignty of Indian nations, in
many important respects, they have also limited it.”).
127. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
128. HARRING, supra note 117, at 1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 104–05 (The process utilized in the case was “one of a number of conflict
resolution mechanisms available to the Sioux,” and “used only after the most serious of
tribal disturbances.”).
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id. at 110.
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Dog of murder under federal law and condemned him to death, the
applicable federal punishment in the territories for murder.133 In an
1883 decision, the Supreme Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
reversed the Dakota Territorial court’s conviction, and ordered Crow
Dog’s release from prison, finding that the federal district court did
not have jurisdiction over the crime.134 The U.S. federal courts had no
jurisdiction to prosecute because the crime occurred within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Sioux Tribe, based on the existing federal stat-
utes and the Treaty of 1868 between the United States and the
Sioux.135 Under these laws, Indians were not subject to federal prose-
cution for Indian against Indian offenses and could only be punished
by the law of their tribe.136
The use of tradition and custom in handling such a case was seen
as “primitive” by those outside the local law of the tribes.137 The Su-
preme Court decision removed Crow Dog from the federal death pen-
alty and was perceived as an acquittal for the murder of Spotted Tail, a
Brule Sioux chief (and federal agent).138 Federal outrage prompted a
swift congressional response. In 1885, Congress passed the Major
Crimes Act, mandating prosecution in federal court of enumerated
“major” crimes committed by Indians within Indian Country.139 Tribes
retained concurrent jurisdiction, but tribal powers to impose
sentences were limited under the Indian Civil Rights Act.140
Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka represented an important recognition by
the Supreme Court of the existence and the efficacy of traditional tri-
bal justice to address a serious offense. The Court, however, was less
interested in upholding traditional justice than it was in providing a
strict interpretation of the jurisdictional lines, and signaling to Con-
gress that a legislative enactment was necessary to complete the subju-
gation of tribal Indians via federal punishment.141 Congress received
133. Ex parte Crow Dog (Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka), 109 U.S. 556, 558 (1883).
134. Id. at 572.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE
11 (1983).
138. See HARRING, supra note 117, at 1, 132.
139. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). Currently, tribes retain concurrent
jurisdiction, but tribal process and sentencing authority are limited under the Indian Civil
Rights Act.
140. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006).
141. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka, 109 U.S. at 558–67, 572 (“To give to the clauses in the
treaty of 1868 and the agreement of 1877 effect, so as to uphold the jurisdiction exercised
in this case, would be to reverse in this instance the general policy of the government
towards the Indians, as declared in many statutes and treaties, and recognized in many
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the message and quickly enacted the Major Crimes Act within the
next two years. A later Supreme Court decision described the hasty
nature of the Major Crimes Act and its obvious purpose:
This is the last section of the Indian appropriation bill for that
year, and is very clearly a continuation of the policy upon which
Congress entered several years previously, of attempting, so far as
possible and consistent with justice and existing obligations, to re-
duce the Indians to individual subjection to the laws of the country
and dispense with their tribal relations.142
The murder of the Indian federal agent Spotted Tail by Crow
Dog perpetuated an idea of lawlessness on the reservation that per-
vades criminal law in Indian Country to this day.143 The undeniable
premise of the reactive Major Crimes Act legislation was that a serious
crime had to be dealt with in a serious federal court in order to mete
out a legitimate punishment.144
The assumption that Crow Dog was not sufficiently punished in
accordance with tribal understandings of justice, however, is flawed.
The death of one Brule Sioux at the hands of another would have
been significant—the loss of life given to the whole would have been
something akin to a spiritual matter, not taken lightly. The direct and
collateral effects of the loss of leadership, companionship, support,
community—even the sheer loss of numbers, even if only one—would
have been felt by some, if not all. The statuses of the victim and perpe-
trator, in addition to the political implications and the threat to the
balance of federal and tribal authority, played an important role in
the internal struggle, as it did in the congressional response.
The fact that families settled the matter internally with money,
horses, food, and tangible goods as reparations for the physical and
intangible loss may have been seen by outsiders as denigrating the
major importance of a human life. Perhaps Congress, as an outsider
from the Indian justice perspective, misinterpreted the offer and ac-
ceptance of material goods as repayment for the loss of life. The offer
decisions of this court, from the beginning to the present time. To justify such a departure,
in such a case, requires a clear expression of the intention of Congress, and that we have
not been able to find. It results that the First District Court of Dakota was without jurisdic-
tion to find or try the indictment against the prisoner, that the conviction and sentence are
void, and that his imprisonment is illegal.”).
142. Ex parte Gon-shay-ee, 130 U.S. 343, 350 (1889).
143. The Major Crimes Act in effect today continues to give effect to this idea of law-
lessness, by uniquely subjecting Native American adults and children to far graver conse-
quences than others sentenced under state court systems.
144. Otherwise, the tribal restorative punishment imposed would have served as a
model for federal justice, instead of the imposition of federal court jurisdiction.
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of goods under local tradition and reconciliation would have been
essential to survival in the plains, though, from the lens of an outsider
looking to punish the untimely death of a federal agent, the tradi-
tional reparations could have been seen as a token amount.
Congressional desire to punish the Indian was exceeded only by
the need to extinguish a direct threat to federal authority. The fact
that the victim was a federal agent threatened federal power and au-
thority in Indian Country. It is not an overstatement to say that the
congressional reaction to Crow Dog was fueled by the federal govern-
ment’s desire to bring Indians into the federal arena to make sure
that Indians were punishable by the death penalty. From the tribal
point of view, the Major Crimes Act was not a “partnership” between
the Sioux, tribal family, and the federal government. Rather, the Ma-
jor Crimes Act constituted a sea change for tribal federal relations: a
stripping away of tradition, and a shift in power from that of tribal
community to self-govern under “local law of the tribe” to the federal
government. This was a direct displacement of tribal right to govern
crime and punishment and a denouncement of tribal traditional
justice.
3. Courts of Indian Offenses and Public Law 280
Courts of Indian Offenses, created and administered by the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, imposed a western-style court to administer jus-
tice where the non-Indian outsiders believed none existed.145 After
the Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ka decision and the enactment of the Major
Crimes Act, the Bureau of Indian Affairs continued in this vein to as-
similate tribes and direct them away from their native practices.
In 1892, Congress outlawed the practice of Indian traditional cer-
emony146 and imposed tribal administrative court systems to punish
the newly outlawed civil “crimes” of being a practicing Indian, among
other things.147 These administrative courts introduced and imposed
145. See Valencia-Weber, Innovative Law, supra note 7, at 232–37 (providing an overview
of Courts of Indian Offenses, also known as BIA courts or CFR courts).
146. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir.
1999) (“By the late 19th Century federal attempts to replace traditional Indian religions
with Christianity grew violent. In 1890 for example, the United States Calvary shot and
killed 300 unarmed Sioux men, women and children en route to an Indian religious cere-
mony called the Ghost Dance . . . . In 1892, Congress outlawed the practice of traditional
Indian religious rituals on reservation land. Engaging in the Sun Dance . . . was punishable
by withholding 10 days’ rations or 10 days’ imprisonment.”).
147. Id.; see also United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 576 (D. Or. 1888) (involving an
underlying prosecution for adultery and referred to statutes prescribing “the punishment
for certain acts called therein ‘Indian offenses,’ such as the ‘sun,’ the ‘scalp,’ and the ‘war-
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western justice and civil laws to address and control unwanted behav-
iors by Indians within their own lands.148 In this way, the federal gov-
ernment criminalized facets of Indian life. Tribal sovereign “law” and
mechanisms of dispute resolution withered and died in some commu-
nities. Courts of Indian Offenses continue to operate today as the sole
justice system on some reservations.149
Later, during the Termination era of the 1950s, Congress en-
acted Public Law 280,150 which “withdrew federal criminal jurisdiction
on reservations in six designated states . . . and authorized those same
states to assume criminal jurisdiction and to hear civil cases against
Indians arising in Indian country.”151 The statute transferred jurisdic-
tion over criminal matters from the federal government to certain
states.152 Historically, from the Commerce Clause and treaty provi-
sions, the power to deal with Indian affairs rested with Congress, and
states had no power over the affairs of Indians. Public Law 280 took
civil and criminal jurisdiction from the tribes and from the auspices of
federal control and authority.
4. Indian Civil Rights and the Oliphant Decision
During the era of civil rights legislation, Congress set out to inves-
tigate the civil rights of Native Americans, on and off reservation
lands.153 In 1961, Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina initiated a se-
ries of hearings and field investigations in response to an independent
report154 and a Department of Interior report155 examining civil
dance,’ polygamy, ‘the usual practices of so-called “medicine men,”’ the destruction or
theft of Indian property, and buying or selling Indian women for the purpose of
cohabitation”).
148. See Clapox, 35 F. at 576–78 (Clapox involved an underlying prosecution of a tribal
member for adultery, even though adultery was not a crime under the federal regulations
or tribal rules or law. Instead, adultery was a moral transgression based upon imposed
values, which was prosecuted as a crime in the Umatilla Court of Indian Offenses).
149. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2010).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (2006). For an in depth discussion on Public Law 280 and its
impacts, see generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawless-
ness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997).
151. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 150, at 1406.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1163.
153. The Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. pt. 1, 1–2 [hereinafter 1961
Hearings—Part 1].
154. COMM’N ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AM. INDIAN, A PRO-
GRAM FOR INDIAN CITIZENS (1961).
155. TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS (1961), as reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY (Francis Paul
Prucha ed., 1975).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN102.txt unknown Seq: 29 21-OCT-11 9:36
Summer 2011] RESPECT FOR TRIBAL COURTS 65
rights problems of individual Indians and the question of how Indian
tribal governments relate to the federal Constitution and its protec-
tions.156 Senator Ervin sought to investigate and address the civil
rights gap existing for tribal people due to the inapplicability of the
Bill of Rights to tribal governments.157 The investigation reflected the
widespread concern that “the preservation of tribal rights and customs
has seemed in some areas to come in conflict with the constitutional
rights of individual Indians as American citizens.”158 At issue was the
fact that “Indian tribes are not subject to Federal constitutional limita-
tions in the Bill of Rights.”159
The resulting legislation, the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”),160
applied a modified version of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments,
imposed a limitation on the sentencing authority of tribes, and explic-
itly allowed federal habeas review for tribal court orders.161 The final
version of the ICRA reflected a compromise between the original in-
tention to bring tribes fully under the umbrella of the federal Consti-
tution and the recognition of tribal sovereignty.162
The ICRA has been interpreted as a deliberate intrusion on tribal
sovereignty but with a decidedly limited right of federal court re-
view.163 With the exception of habeas corpus, the ICRA did not au-
156. 1961 Hearings—Part 1, supra note 153.
157. For a comprehensive analysis of the ICRA and Senator Ervin’s interests, see Don-
ald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 ‘Indian Civil Rights’ Act, 9 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 557 (1972).
158. 1961 Hearings—Part 1, supra note 153, at 5 (remarks of Sen. Kenneth Keating).
159. 1961 Hearings—Part 1, supra note 153, at 8 (remarks of Sen. Frank Church). The
United States Constitution does not apply to Tribal governments. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896).
160. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Tit. II–VII, §§ 201–701, 82
Stat. 77, 77–81 (codified in part as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006)). Signed
into law as Titles II through VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the act provided sweeping
change addressing aspects of the underlying extensive investigation. Title II, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1303, included the “Indian Bill of Rights”; Title III, id. §§ 1311–1312, directed the
Secretary of the Interior to publish a model code for Courts of Indian Offenses and to
provide training for the judges of these courts; Title IV, id. §§ 1321–1326, provided that
states may not assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country without the prior
consent of the tribe; Title V, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, made a minor amendment to federal crimi-
nal law applicable to Indian Country; Title VI, 25 U.S.C. § 1331, lessens Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”) control over tribal employment of legal counsel; Title VII, id. § 1341, au-
thorized the Secretary of the Interior to revise and republish Felix Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, the landmark treatise on Federal Indian law.
161. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (originally limiting sentencing authority to six months and
a fine of $500, later expanded to one year); id. § 1303 (the writ of habeas corpus for fed-
eral review of tribal court orders of detention); infra note 172.
162. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
163. See id. at 51 n.1 for an overview of the legislative history of the ICRA.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-1\SAN102.txt unknown Seq: 30 21-OCT-11 9:36
66 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
thorize suits against tribes or tribal officials without congressional
consent.164 In Santa Clara v. Martinez, the Supreme Court held that, as
a matter of statutory construction, the ICRA did not abrogate the sov-
ereign immunity of the tribe to allow an individual to sue the tribe in
federal court for an alleged civil rights violation.165 The ICRA has
been both criticized as an imposition of foreign notions of rights and
justice on Indian tribes166 and hailed as a recognition of the tribe’s
ability to protect its own citizenry.167
Subsequently, the Supreme Court unambiguously eroded tribal
jurisdiction with its decision in Oliphant. In 1978, the Court held that
tribes had no jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians in criminal mat-
ters, despite the fact that the crimes occurred on tribal lands.168 The
Court reasoned that although Indian tribes retained certain “quasi-
sovereign” authority, tribes were prohibited from exercising sovereign
powers “inconsistent with their status” as domestic-dependent na-
tions.169 A decade later, in Duro v. Reina,170 the Court further eroded
tribal sovereign powers in criminal matters. In Duro, the Supreme
Court held that Indian courts had no jurisdiction over non-member
Indians who committed an offense within the reservation bounda-
ries.171 The Duro decision added to the complex jurisdictional quag-
mire and created a jurisdictional gap for certain crimes. Six months
after the Court’s decision in Duro, Congress amended the ICRA to
recognize and affirm “the inherent power of Indian tribes” in order
“to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”172
Other amendments to the ICRA limited tribal court jurisdiction
to prosecute and punish even the tribe’s own membership.173 Tribal
power to sentence was limited to imposition of sentences up to one
164. 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
165. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71–72.
166. Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495 (1994) (question-
ing whether there is an unspoken assumption that tribal jurisdiction is inherently violative
of individual rights and whether that is justified or racist).
167. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71–72 (holding that federal courts have no jurisdic-
tion over internal tribal matters).
168. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978) (finding Indian
tribal courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, absent congressional
authorization).
169. Id. at 212.
170. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).
171. Id. at 693–96.
172. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
173. Id. § 1302(7).
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year and a fine of $5000, or both.174 Congress recently expanded the
sphere of tribal power to sentence to a maximum of three years, a fine
of $15,000, or both, providing substantial conditions are met.175 The
erosion of tribal criminal authority and autonomy and the encroach-
ment of federal and state power has led to outcomes that include an
over-representation of Natives in the federal criminal justice system.176
To understand the effects, a review of the federal sentencing scheme
is necessary.
B. A Brief History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Because of the Major Crimes Act and their political status as Indi-
ans, individual Native Americans face criminal charges in federal
court instead of state court. Prosecution of Indians in federal courts
has survived an equal protection claim of invidious discrimination
based upon race and a double jeopardy challenge.177 This is true even
though federal prosecution would remove a defense and would, ar-
guably, allow an easier conviction under a federal felony murder stat-
ute or subject the Indian to dual or successive prosecutions in tribal
and federal courts.178
Because Natives face federal sentencing authority, the Sentencing
Guidelines remain a fixture for tribes and Indian individuals.179 As-
sessing the role of the Sentencing Guidelines in the modern history of
crime and punishment thus becomes an indispensable part of under-
standing Indian criminal justice.180
174. Id. § 1302(7)–(8). Originally limiting tribal courts to sentences of six months or
fines of $500, or both, the ICRA was amended to allow harsher penalties in 1986 by the
Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, Tit. IV, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-137, 3207-146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006)).
175. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211 § 234 (2010).
176. See generally LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEPHEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME (1999).
177. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding that federal prosecution
presented no equal protection problem).
178. Id.; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that federal prosecu-
tion presented no double jeopardy problem).
179. In addition, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is limited to all but prior
convictions.
180. In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Booker, 543 U.S. 220, that mandatory applica-
tion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, applying Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In
light of this holding, the Court concluded that the two provisions of the Sentencing Re-
form Act that make the Guidelines mandatory must be severed and excised, rendering the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory only. Federal courts are required to consider the
Guidelines’ ranges, but are permitted to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns.
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The introduction of the Sentencing Guidelines in 1984 abruptly
changed two hundred years of practice in criminal sentencing.181
Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, federal trial judges were entrusted
with broad discretion to impose a sentence on a federal offender.182
Federal definition of the crime and the punishment imposed were
separate.183 Congress prescribed a maximum penalty for each
crime.184 Constrained only by the statutory maximum, a federal judge
could impose whatever sentence he believed appropriate based upon
the circumstances of the case.185
The parole system, introduced in 1910, served to reduce judicial
control over the length of the sentence served, but left the judge with
significant authority through the power to grant or deny eligibility for
parole.186 Federal judges were not required to explain their sentenc-
ing decisions on the record, and appellate review of those decisions
was not available.187
This changed profoundly with Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) of
1984.188 The SRA stripped federal judges of the authority to deter-
mine the factors relevant to sentencing and the range of punishment
in most cases, and transferred these powers to a newly created federal
agency, the U.S. Sentencing Commission.189 The task of this nine-
member panel, working as an independent agency of the federal judi-
ciary, was to overhaul the sentencing policies of the federal criminal
181. See KATE STITH & JOSE´ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1998) (Describing the long history of judicial discretion in sen-
tencing from the beginning of the Republic until enactment of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987, Stith and Cabranes explain that “[o]n November 1, 1987, two centuries
of sentencing practice in the federal courts came to an abrupt end.”).
182. See, e.g., David Fisher, Fifth Amendment—Prosecutorial Discretion Not Absolute: Constitu-
tional Limits on Decision Not To File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 744, 745 (1993) (“Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, federal judges
enjoyed extremely broad discretion in sentencing. A judge could impose any sentence she
thought was proper as long as it did not exceed the statutory maximum.”).
183. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 181, at 9.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Congress mandated in 1910 that each federal prison have its own parole board,
constituting the superintendent of prisons of the Department of Justice, the warden, and
physician of each penitentiary. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819. The parole
board had discretion to release any prisoner after one-third of his original sentence was
served, upon a board determination of “reasonable probability that [the prisoner] will live
and remain at liberty without violating the laws,” and release “is not incompatible with the
welfare of society.” Id. § 3, 36 Stat. at 819–20.
187. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 181.
188. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. II, sec.
212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1988 (codified at 18 USC §§ 3551–3673 (2006)) (including the SRA).
189. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 181, at 1, 2–3.
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justice system; its mission was to achieve uniformity and proportional-
ity in sentencing.190
The final version of the SRA, which was part of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act, reflected the desire of reformers to toughen
their position on crime.191 The Sentencing Guidelines proclaimed—
without citing any support—that many sentences did not fit the seri-
ousness of the crime.192 The stated objectives were to avoid “unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity” among defendants “with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct” (by providing Sen-
tencing Guidelines and appellate review), and promote “honesty in
sentencing” (by providing for the elimination of parole).193
As part of the same legislation that created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Congress established mandatory minimum sentences for
certain federal crimes, including drug offenses.194 Mandatory mini-
mum penalties limit the discretion of federal judges by requiring that
sentences be based solely on the type and amount of drugs involved,
the criminal history of the defendant, and other aggravating circum-
stances, such as possession of a weapon during the crime.195 Statutory
mandatory minimums gave judges even less flexibility in sentencing
than the Sentencing Guidelines.196
The SRA abolished federal parole.197 Those defendants convicted
and sentenced prior to the sentencing reform remain under the “old”
law or pre-existing parole scheme.198 The SRA requires defendants to
serve their court-imposed sentences, minus approximately fifteen per-
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 42.
192. Id. at 60.
193. Id. at 40.
194. Id. at 125.
195. Id.
196. But see USSG, supra note 1, § 5C1.2 (Also known as the Safety Valve provision,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006), this section was designed to ameliorate the effects
of harsh mandatory minimum provisions as to the least culpable offenders.).
197. The legal powers of the Parole Commission as it existed immediately before the
adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines are set out at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218 (1982) (re-
pealed 1984).
198. “Old” law is a term of art referring to the parole act that existed prior to the SRA.
Thus, there exists a parallel system of “old” parole and “new” non-parole sentences being
served by convicts today.
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cent for good behavior, if applicable.199 Such sentence reductions
may not exceed fifty-four days per year.200
1. The Federal Sentencing Table
The heart of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is the sentencing
table.201 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the judicial function is
transformed from exercising discretion to select a particular sentence
from a very broad range to making those factual findings that dictate
the particular sentencing range.202
At sentencing, the judge employs the preponderance-of-evidence
standard to make those findings advised by the Sentencing Guide-
lines, and establishes the defendant’s sentencing range on a 258-box
sentencing grid or table. The Sentencing Guidelines attempt to list
and define every offense and offender characteristic that might play a
role in sentencing.203 Using a two-dimensional grid, the table catego-
rizes offenses according to the seriousness of the crime (levels one
through forty-three) and the defendant’s criminal history (categories
one through six).204 The higher the level (or criminal history), the
longer the possible sentence that may be imposed on the
defendant.205
a. Offense Level206
The vertical axis consists of forty-three offense-level categories
and is determined by selecting the appropriate offense level from the
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2006) (providing a federal prisoner serving a sentence of
more than one year, with credit of up to fifty-four days for “exemplary compliance with
institutional disciplinary regulations” as determined by the Bureau of Prisons).
200. However, based upon the Bureau of Prison’s formula used to calculate good time,
the most an inmate can earn is forty-seven days. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5880.28, at 1–45 (1999), available at http://www.bop.gov/
policy/progstat/5880_028.pdf; see Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499 (2010) (upholding
the BOP’s method of calculating good time credit under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b) resulting in a
maximum of forty-seven days credit); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir.
2001) (also upholding the BOP’s method of calculating good time credit). For an explana-
tion of the calculation, see Frequently Asked Questions on Mandatory Minimums, FAMILIES
AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Federal%20
Good%20Time%20FAQs%206.7.10.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
201. USSG, supra note 1, § 5A; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 181, at 3.
202. USSG, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt. A.
203. Id. ch. 2; see, e.g., id. § 2B3.1.
204. Id. § 5A.
205. See generally id. ch. 5, pt. A (displaying the Sentencing Table showing increasing
sentencing ranges up to life in prison).
206. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.1.
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Sentencing Guidelines. The offense level can then be adjusted up-
ward or downward depending on factual findings of those aggravating
and mitigating circumstances listed in the manual, such as whether
the defendant brandished a weapon or accepted responsibility for the
offense. The maximum offense mandates a life sentence. Lower
figures represent the minimum a defendant with no criminal history
would receive.
b. Criminal History Category207
The horizontal axis is determined by the defendant’s criminal
history. The defendant’s applicable criminal history category, from I
to VI, is determined by counting the prior qualifying convictions and
calculating a criminal history score.208 As mentioned, tribal court con-
victions and foreign nation convictions are not counted. Under this
rather mechanical process, the judge’s discretion is limited to select-
ing the sentence within the very narrow range offered by the defen-
dant’s place in the grid.
c. Adjustments209
The Sentencing Guidelines factor in the particular role the de-
fendant played in the criminal endeavor and aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstances that warrant an increase or decrease in the
sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for adjustments in cases
where, for example, the defendant obstructs justice, physically re-
strains the victim, and/or plays a major or minor role in the crime.
d. Departures210
There are recognized upward and downward departures under
the Sentencing Guidelines, allowing for arguments for a longer or
shorter sentencing range. In the SRA, Congress included several pro-
visions directing the Sentencing Commission to determine the rele-
vance, appropriateness, and extent that special characteristics of the
defendant might be considered in sentencing.211
There are specific offender characteristics prohibited by Con-
gress, such as race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-eco-
207. Id. ch. 4, pt. A.
208. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.3.
209. Id. §§ 3A–E.
210. Id. § 1A4(b).
211. Id. § 5H (commentary on Special Offender Characteristics).
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nomic status, as well as lack of youthful guidance.212 Also deemed
generally inappropriate or irrelevant, and therefore “discouraged” as
grounds for any downward departure in sentencing, are important
personal characteristics of the defendant, such as education, voca-
tional skills, employment record, community ties, and family ties and
responsibilities.213 The Sentencing Commission has also determined
that even drug and alcohol addiction or dependency is not grounds
for a downward departure.214 Other factors, such as age, mental con-
dition, and physical condition, can be relevant to sentencing if they
are present to an unusual degree so as to distinguish the case as
outside the “heartland” of typical cases.215
Federal criminal defendants can receive a shorter sentence if they
provide substantial assistance to authorities, defined as providing in-
vestigators and prosecutors with information leading to the indict-
ment of other offenders.216 Only the prosecution can move for a
reduced sentence based on the substantial assistance clause of the
Sentencing Guidelines.217 The possibility of receiving a reduced sen-
tence often provides a powerful incentive for defendants to cooperate.
2. Application to Native American Defendants
For the purpose of computing an Indian defendant’s sentence in
federal court, tribal court convictions and sentences are not counted
in criminal history computations, but can be a basis for an upward
departure.218
Specifically, USSG §4A1.2(i) provides that “[s]entences resulting
from tribal court convictions are not counted but may be considered
under §4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).”219 Tribal
convictions are thus treated like convictions from foreign nations.220
The exemption of tribal convictions and sentences from the fed-
eral criminal history calculation may be seen as an unfair advantage or
a windfall for the Indian defendant. One may worry that an Indian
212. Id. §§ 5H1.10, 5H1.12; 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
213. USSG, supra note 1, §§ 5H1.2, 5H1.5–1.6, 5H1.11–1.12; 18 U.S.C. § 994(e).
214. USSG, supra note 1, § 5H1.4.
215. Id. §§ 5H1.1, 5H.1.3–1.4; 18 U.S.C. § 994(d); see also USSG, supra note 1, ch. 1, pt.
A(1)(4)(b).
216. USSG, supra note 1, § 5K.
217. Id.
218. Id. § 4A1.2(i) (providing that “[s]entences resulting from tribal court convictions
are not counted, but may be considered under §4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History
Category)”).
219. Id. § 4A1.3.
220. Id. § 4A1.2(h).
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defendant would be free to commit numerous crimes on the reserva-
tion without impacting his federal criminal history score once he fi-
nally lands in federal court under the Major Crimes Act. This,
however, is not the case. The federal sentencing guidelines are not
blind to the existence of a tribal court record, and, in fact, include
specific provisions to incorporate Indian criminal history.
Should the defendant have an extensive criminal history that is
not captured by the criminal history score (either because the
sentences are too “old” to be counted, are part of a juvenile record, or
are from a tribal or foreign court), there is a recognized upward de-
parture that allows the unrepresented criminal history to be taken
into account, thereby offering a longer sentence.221
It is important to note that departure from the Sentencing Guide-
lines based on race and socio-economic status is explicitly forbidden
in the Sentencing Guidelines.222 In keeping with the goal of uniform-
ity of sentencing, Congress prohibited the Sentencing Commission
from including any consideration of “race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status” of the defendant in the Sentencing Guide-
lines’ factors.223 As a result, Natives can receive longer sentences
under the Sentencing Guidelines for a tribal criminal record, but they
cannot seek to mitigate their federal sentence based upon the factors
that might apply to them either racially or politically.
C. Impact on Native Americans
Lest the federal sentencing scheme be misunderstood to favor
Natives, based on the exemption of tribal court convictions, empirical
experience shows the impact of federal criminal authority on Native
Americans to be severe. Through the Major Crimes Act, Congress has
federalized a large number of criminal offenses, all of which apply in
Indian Country. In addition, because of the Major Crimes Act’s juris-
dictional requirement, a disproportionate number of Natives are sub-
ject to federal criminal prosecution, and once in the penal system,
they tend to remain indefinitely.224 In 2002, the Sentencing Commis-
221. Id.
222. Id. § 5H1.10.
223. Id. § 5H1.1; 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Swift Hawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d 384, 384–85 (D.S.D. 2000)
(“Congress has seen fit to impose altogether different penalties on Native Americans driv-
ing under the influence in Indian Country . . . . Thus, Swift Hawk faces up to five years
more time in prison and a much higher fine than a similarly situated Norwegian or, for
that matter, another Native American driving in Sioux Falls. This is without taking into
account the terrible harshness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in their treatment of
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sion created a Native American Advisory Group to address the per-
ceived racism against and disparate effects on Native Americans in
federal sentencing.225 The group determined a disparity in sentencing
exists226 and that Native Americans serve longer sentences in federal
custody under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Incarceration rates of Native Americans are thirty-eight percent
higher than the rest of the population.227 Despite small numbers in
the general population, Native Americans have the second highest in-
carceration rate of all races and ethnicities.228 The over-representa-
tion of Natives in penitentiaries is especially prevalent in states with
larger Native American populations.229
In addition, Native American children are disproportionately im-
pacted by the current sentencing scheme. There are generally few
juveniles in the federal prison system; however, a large proportion of
the juveniles that are incarcerated are Indian.230 Because of the Major
Crimes Act, and the federal proscription on tribal court sentencing,
children who commit serious offenses are prosecuted in federal court
and face harsher federal penalties.231 Historically, the federal juvenile
Native Americans.”); see generally NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 19,
at 9; S.D. ADVISORY COMM., NATIVE AMERICANS IN SOUTH DAKOTA: AN EROSION OF CONFI-
DENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/sd0300/
main.htm.
225. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 10–11.
226. Id. at 17–27. The Native American Advisory Group discussed the results of its eigh-
teen-month study reviewing Sentencing Guidelines’ sentences for manslaughter, sexual
abuse, and aggravated assault at a public hearing with the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
stating that it had found a “significant negative disparity in sentencing of Native American
people,” but arriving at the opinion that the disparity was “a jurisdictional thing . . . not a
racial matter.” Public Hearing of the Native American Advisory Group and U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission 9 (Nov. 4, 2003) (statement of C.J. Lawrence L. Piersol, Chair of the Native Ameri-
can Advisory Group), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/
Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20031104-5/NAAGhear.pdf; see also Droske, supra note
114, at 723–26, 741–46 (providing case studies); Gregory D. Smith, Disparate Impact of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country: Why Congress Should Run the Erie
Railroad into the Major Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 483, 509–11 (2004).
227. See generally STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE,




231. See Standefer, supra note 109, at 489 (“As a result of federal criminal jurisdiction
over major felonies in Indian Country, many Native Americans are sentenced according to
the federal Sentencing Guidelines. This is problematic because individuals convicted in
federal court are generally subject to harsher penalties than those convicted in state or
tribal courts.”); see also Terry L. Cross, Native Americans and Juvenile Justice: A Hidden Tragedy,
POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 19, available at http://www.
prrac.org/full_text.php?text_id=1205&item_id=11356&newsletter_id=102&header=Sym-
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prison population has been predominantly Native American males.232
A 2000 study found that seventy-nine percent of all juveniles in federal
custody are Native American.233 Eighty-nine percent of the Indian
Country juvenile cases prosecuted in federal court resulted in convic-
tions, and the average sentence imposed was thirty-nine months.234 A
majority of the total population of incarcerated Indian youth comes
from Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and North Da-
kota.235 Particularly disturbing is the fact that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons fails to own or operate any detention or treatment center for
the juvenile population, relying instead on state or private facilities.236
Housed far from home and without culturally appropriate treatment,
or, in some cases, without treatment altogether, the likelihood of re-
cidivism grows. If a Native juvenile returns to federal court as an adult,
he returns with a federal juvenile record.237 Unlike tribal court convic-
tions, these juvenile convictions are counted in the criminal history
calculation.238
The historical background of tribal jurisdiction and of the federal
sentencing scheme provide a broader analytical framework for crimi-
nal law in Indian Country. From this perspective, the lens of respect
tells a different story. The idea that the Sentencing Guidelines should
be changed to count tribal convictions does not adequately address
the historical disadvantages Native Americans face in the federal crim-
inal justice system. Nor does it restore a modicum of respect to tribal
posium:%20Native%20Americans%20and%20Alaska%20Natives:%20The%20Forgotten%
20Minority (“American Indian youth are grossly over-represented in state and federal juve-
nile justice systems and secure confinement. Incarcerated Indian youth are much more
likely to be subjected to the harshest treatment in the most restrictive environments and
less likely to have received the help they need from other systems.”). Cross, the Executive
Director of the National Indian Child Welfare Association in Portland, Oregon, is an en-
rolled member of the Seneca Nation of Indians.
232. See generally PERRY, supra note 227.
233. See Cross, supra note 231, at 19 (indicating that as of October 2000, seventy-nine
percent of youth in custody in the Federal Bureau of Prisons were Native American).
234. URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., TRIBAL YOUTH IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 34
(2011).
235. Id. at 32; see also PERRY, supra note 227, at 37–38.
236. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DIRECTORY OF BUREAU OF PRISONS: CONTRACT JUVE-
NILE FACILITIES 2 (2011), available at http://www.bop.gov/locations/cc/Juvenile_Dir.pdf
(“The Bureau enters into agreements with tribal, state, and local governments, and into
contracts with private organization, to provide for secure and non-secure services.”).
237. USSG, supra note 1, § 4A1.2(d) (counting federal juvenile convictions under the
federal sentencing guidelines).
238. See id. § 4A1.2(d)(1)–(2) (adding one to three points for juvenile convictions de-
pending on the length and timing of the juvenile sentence).
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sovereigns suffering the erosion of tribal criminal justice authority
over time.
III. Difference and Respect
Despite serious ramifications of the proposed recognition of tri-
bal criminal convictions, Washburn concludes that it is entirely appro-
priate for states to “respect” the criminal convictions of tribal courts
mainly because tribal courts are “very much like the state and federal
court systems.”239 Because his argument requires congruence between
tribal and state courts, Washburn goes to great lengths to demonstrate
that the tribal convictions are the same as and equal to state convic-
tions and should be so treated by the federal government. This argu-
ment reflects a misunderstanding of the role of difference in tribal
sovereignty, judicial systems, and practice in the community.
The proposal to treat tribal courts as state courts rather than as
foreign courts for the purpose of federal sentencing, in order to pro-
mote respect for tribal sovereignty, is misguided. The proposal is
based on a comparison of tribal systems with federal and state court
systems. This comparison acknowledges but attempts to discount dif-
ference as not important, or at least not as important, as the similari-
ties between tribal and state court systems.
As separate sovereigns, tribes are not part of the system of fed-
eral/state hierarchy. One cannot equate tribal and state sovereigns
without the inherent value judgment that the federal/state system is
superior or that tribal courts should be incorporated into the hierar-
chy. Understanding the cultural judgments involved in the compari-
son requires an understanding of the political and moral assumptions
involved in the assessment of difference and sameness.
Other scholars have explored concepts of difference and same-
ness in an effort to define Indian sovereignty. As suggested by Frank
Pommersheim, a separate sovereign implicates two main components:
(1) the recognition of “a government’s proper zone,” meaning,
“zones of authority free from intrusion by other sovereigns,”240 and
(2) “the understanding that within these zones the sovereign may en-
act substantive rules that are potentially divergent or ‘different’ from
that of the other—even dominant—sovereigns within the system.”241
239. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 426; Washburn, Different Kind, supra note
2, at 288.
240. Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, 421 (1992) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Liberation].
241. Id.
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To Christine Zuni Cruz, the link between tribal “traditional law,
self-determination and sovereignty is clear.”242 Writing about the de-
velopment of internal law, Zuni Cruz offers, “an indigenous nation’s
sovereignty is strengthened if its law is based upon its own internalized
values and norms.”243 This understanding applies with equal force to
outsiders standing in review of a tribal court system. As suggested by
Zuni Cruz, “consideration must be given to what the underlying values
and norms of tribal society are, how they differ or coincide with the
values and norms of enacted law and when they differ, what internal
(traditional) law will be displaced by the enacted law and why.”244
Difference is a defining element of sovereignty, notes Professor
Judith Resnick:
At the core of federal courts’ jurisprudence is a question that has
often gone under the name of “sovereignty” but may more fruit-
fully be explored in the context of difference. If the word “sover-
eign” has any meaning in contemporary federal courts’
jurisprudence, its meaning comes from a state’s or a tribe’s ability
to maintain different modes from those of the federal
government.245
Once conferred, the power of the tribe, a separate sovereign with
its own zone of influence, to enact its own judicial system that reflects
internal norms—even if different or divergent from others—becomes
paramount to survival as a distinct self-governing body. If tribal courts
are to have the “vital role in tribal self-government” that the Supreme
Court envisioned,246 the tribes’ ability to develop and interpret a body
of tribal law must be protected.247 Pommersheim’s point clarifies this
important concept. “Tribal courts do not exist solely to reproduce or
replicate the dominant canon appearing in state and federal courts. If
they did, the process of colonization would be complete and the
unique legal cultures of the tribes fully extirpated.”248 Instead, it is the
distinctive legal principles derived from tribal law and applied in the
242. Zuni Cruz, Customs and Traditions, supra note 118, at Conclusion.
243. Id. at Introduction.
244. Id.
245. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 750–51 (1989).
246. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (acknowledging the impor-
tance of tribal courts and upholding the tribal court exhaustion requirement announced
in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).
247. Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Deci-
sions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (1998) (discussing, in part, the importance of tribal court
findings of fact and conclusions of law and limits of federal court review to prevent tribal
courts from being relegated to inferior position).
248. Pommersheim, Liberation, supra note 240, at 420.
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tribal courts that both justify and distinguish separate tribal court
jurisprudence.
The problem with using the same/different analysis to produce
legitimacy is that it does not take into account the inherent tension
between the pressure to assimilate in order to be seen as legitimate
and the pressure to produce systems that reflect internal tradition in
order to be authentic. Pommersheim’s view of difference supplies im-
portant missing pieces. Differences are socially constructed, and their
evaluation as good or bad depends on who is interpreting them and
what norm is used. Pommersheim writes:
An exploration of the dilemma of difference, while very helpful in
understanding the quandary of tribal courts, contains its own para-
doxes. These include considerations of the definition of differ-
ence, the meaning of difference, and the treatment of difference.
Differences, for example, are not inherent, but rather, are social
creations based on some kind of comparison to an often unstated
norm. For example, notions about the qualities of women, minori-
ties, and the handicapped are often based on an unstated compari-
son to white, able-bodied makes. Societies inevitably assign people
to categories in order to organize reality and to provide a frame-
work for economics, politics and government. The important ques-
tion, of course, becomes how the differences are assigned and how
they are treated in terms of power and opportunity.249
The argument that the Sentencing Commission should “recog-
nize that tribal courts are substantially more like state than foreign
courts”250 and that the Sentencing Guidelines should accord tribal
courts the same respect as state and federal courts, presumes that tri-
bal courts are inferior and must be elevated to equate with state
courts.
A. The Dilemma of Difference251
A proposal for symmetrical treatment of civil and criminal adjudi-
cations within a state’s jurisdiction does not acknowledge the differ-
ence between civil and criminal orders. Likewise, the call for similar
treatment between states and tribes in federal court fails to acknowl-
edge the differences among state and tribal court systems, requiring
different treatment to meet differing concerns and goals. The tribal
249. Id. at 422–23.
250. Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission’s Treatment, supra note 2, at 212.
251. Pommersheim, Liberation, supra note 240, at 420 (Drawing richly from the work of
Martha Minnow, Pommershiem explores the meaning of the term coined by Minnow.); see
also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
TRIBAL LIFE (1995).
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court is not in the same judicial hierarchy as the state or municipal
court. The impact of tribal criminal adjudications differs in certain
ways from those of the states. Tribes are diverse in their criminal jus-
tice systems or orders. Such a comparison is offensive to tribal sover-
eignty and serves as a shortcut to recognition of tribal courts,
inconsistent with principles of tribal self-government and at odds with
American constitutional protections.
Acknowledging difference, however, is not enough. The manner
in which difference is treated in terms of power, authority, and oppor-
tunity becomes important in terms of respect.252 As set forth by Pom-
mersheim, “[t]his is true not only within the language of sovereig[nty]
itself, but also as a means of honoring and respecting cultural differ-
ences.”253 Ultimately, the ability to understand and articulate the basis
of difference becomes critical. It is the articulation and understanding
of difference that most fundamentally implicates respect for tribes
and their orders.
Martha Minnow described the dilemma of difference in the con-
text of individual treatment,254 postulating that treating different peo-
ple identically to avoid stigmatization becomes insensitive to the very
differences that may be held dear, yet treating different people differ-
ently risks emphasizing the differences and hindering relationships.
In her book Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American
Law, Minnow argues that categories of difference and sameness, cen-
tral to legal reasoning, rely on tacit assumptions that often obscure
their political and moral effects.255
252. Pommersheim, Liberation, supra note 240, at 423.
253. Id. at 424.
254. MARTHA MINNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990) [hereinafter MINNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE]; see also Martha
Minnow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
72 (1987) (discussing the need to take the perspective of the person you have called
“different”).
255. MINNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 254, at 9, 21, 33–49. Minnow
further states:
[L]aw ends up contributing to rather than challenging assigned categories of dif-
ference that manifest social prejudice and misunderstanding. Especially troubling
is the meaning of equality for individuals identified as different from the norm.
What should equality mean when . . . public institutions make decisions about
people who differ by race, . . . language proficiency, [and] ethnic identity . . . ?
Does equality mean treating everyone the same, even if this similar treatment
affects people differently? Members of minorities may find that a neutral role,
applied equally to all, burdens them disproportionately.
Id. at 9.
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Exploring the dilemma of difference from within federal Indian
law, Pommersheim identifies a “measured separatism.”256 Pommer-
sheim suggests that necessary differences in tribal courts are a matter
of pure survival.257 According to Pommersheim, “pride of difference”
and “Indianness”258 are at the heart of Indian claims of tribal
sovereignty.259
B. Tribal Criminal Court Decisions Are Different from State and
Federal Criminal Decisions
Not counting tribal court convictions does not inherently deter-
mine that tribal courts are deficient, but rather that they are inher-
ently different. When comparing the state and federal government,
the difference may be slight because they share the same origin story.
Tribes, however, do not share that story with states, nor with each
other.
That the due process protections in state and tribal courts are
“virtually identical,”260 as Washburn posits, may be true in theory, but
not in practice. The right to court appointed defense counsel for
those members without the means to hire an attorney is not a require-
ment in tribal court.261 Only a relatively small number of tribes pro-
vide counsel at the tribe’s expense.262
Whether the right to counsel is a difference that should matter
requires consideration. Under the ICRA, defendants have the right to
counsel at the defendant’s own expense.263 The Sixth Amendment to
United States Constitution, however, guarantees the right to counsel
to persons unable to afford counsel.264 This guarantee, made applica-
256. Pommersheim, Liberation, supra note 240, at 415.
257. Id. at 420.
258. Indianness involves a complex interplay of race, culture, sovereignty, member-
ship, and tribal- and self-identity, among other things. For more on the complexities of
defining Indianness in literary scholarship and teaching, see Deborah L. Madsen, Contem-
porary Discourses on Indianness, in NATIVE AUTHENTICITY 1, 1–18 (Deborah L. Madsen, ed.,
2010).
259. Pommersheim, Liberation, supra note 240, at 424.
260. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 426 (“Currently, the nature of those
[ICRA and U.S. Constitutional] protections is virtually identical.”).
261. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2006) (affording Indian defendants “at his own expense
the right to assistance of counsel for his defense”).
262. It is difficult to determine the number of tribes that provide indigent defense
counsel.
263. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6).
264. In a well-established line of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is required to protect the fundamental right
to a fair trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 63 (1932) (“[T]he right to the aid of counsel
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ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, applies to mis-
demeanors.265 In addition, any counsel, whether court-appointed or
retained, must provide effective assistance, in order for this constitu-
tional requirement to be satisfied.266
To argue in favor of counting tribal convictions because, theoreti-
cally, tribal courts “operate as nearly exact replicas of state courts,”267
or because “tribes routinely hear the same kinds of misdemeanor
crimes as state courts”268 disregards the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Similar treatment, meaning counting convictions in federal
court, cannot be based upon the subject matter, but rather must de-
pend upon the due process afforded in federal court. As a matter of
upholding the U.S. Constitution, the federal court system cannot rec-
ognize prior convictions that violate due process protections based on
the Constitution’s ideas of fundamental human and civil rights.269 To
include uncounseled convictions resulting in imprisonment for only
is of this fundamental character.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding the
Sixth Amendment guaranteed a criminal defendant the right to counsel in federal court);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying the right to indigent defense counsel
to the states). The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but
it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the
Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Importantly, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33, 37 (1972),
the Supreme Court held that no person can be imprisoned for any offense, whether it be
classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless he had the assistance of counsel at trial.
265. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
266. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (recognizing that the right to
counsel includes the effective assistance of counsel, finding that “[c]ounsel, however, can
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by failing to render
‘adequate legal assistance’” and setting forth the standard for effective assistance).
267. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 426; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish In-
dian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978) (noting that “some Indian tribal court systems
have become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state
counterparts”).
268. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 426.
269. A prior uncounseled state conviction may be counted as part of the criminal his-
tory, if no imprisonment was imposed. USSG, supra note 1, § 4A1.2; see Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994) (defendant sentenced under Sentencing Guidelines
properly assessed additional criminal history point for uncounseled state misdemeanor
conviction for which defendant was fined, but not incarcerated).
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Native Americans creates due process and equal protection problems
between Indian and non-Indian U.S. citizens.
Even assuming that some tribal courts are replicas of state and
federal courts, this is not true for all tribal courts, nor should it be.
Despite the historical impacts, proscriptions, and impositions on tribal
justice systems, tribal courts still represent an exercise of inherent tri-
bal sovereignty, sovereignty that predates the formation of the United
States and its Constitution. Operation and application of inherent sov-
ereignty requires recognition of tribal justice systems as separate and
distinct. The pressure to replicate state court structures is significant
and comes with incentives that are impossible to resist when packaged
in the form of funding, training, technical assistance, law enforce-
ment, safety, and ultimately, legitimacy.
That tribal courts have had to replicate state courts in order to be
“sophisticated” and “civilized,”270 and in order to be legitimate should
not be mistaken for endorsement of the state court system. This for-
mal replication does not take into account tribal indigenous knowl-
edge, peacemaking, or restorative justice principles that predate any
state or federal court system and which tribes have the right to pro-
vide. Any debate about the similarities between state and tribal juris-
diction, procedure, and adjudications misses the mark. As Max
Minzner asserts, “whatever tribes are like, they are not all alike.”271
270. See, e.g., United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (“[T]he reservation
itself is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the charge of
an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish
the civilized from the uncivilized man.”). In Oliphant v. Suquamish, Justice Rehnquist de-
scribes this requirement of look-alike justice. 435 U.S. at 211–12 (“We recognize that some
Indian tribal court systems have become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many
respects their state counterparts.”); id. at 179 (“For example, the 1830 Treaty with the
Choctaw Indian Tribe, which had one of the most sophisticated of tribal structures, guar-
anteed to the Tribe.”).
271. Max Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside Indian
Country, 6 NEV. L. J. 89, 90 (2005). (“[J]udges and commentators have debated extensively,
about whether tribes are like states, the federal government or like foreign countries. The
debate misses the point that whatever tribes are like, they are not all alike.”).
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C. All Tribes Are Not All Alike272
There are 565 federally recognized tribes273 in this country,
which has never extinguished aboriginal rule.274 In light of the right
to inherent tribal sovereignty, this means that 565 tribal entities could
potentially present 565 different justice systems. In reality, there are
close to 200 tribal court systems in existence.275 This number does not
include over 160 tribal courts in Native Alaskan villages and communi-
ties.276 In addition, twenty-one C.F.R. courts (a colloquial name for
the Courts of Indian Offenses codified in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions at 25 C.F.R. 11.100) serve to administer justice in Indian Country
on those reservations where tribes have retained exclusive jurisdiction
over Indians, but have not established a tribal court to exercise that
jurisdiction.277
As previously described, tribes range in size from tremendous to
tiny. Some have gaming operations, oil and gas holdings, timber, land,
or commercial enterprises that lead to tribal revenues or per capita
payments.278 Others have none. Tribes are located in border areas,
within major metropolitan areas, or stretched across isolated areas,
inaccessible during certain times of the year. Some tribes can afford to
272. Id.
273. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,218 (Aug. 11, 2009) (listing federally rec-
ognized Indian tribes). The Secretary of the Interior is required to keep, publish and regu-
larly update a list of all federally recognized tribes pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a, 479a-1
(2006). Tribes that maintain a legal relationship with the federal government through a
treaty, act of Congress, executive order or are acknowledged under 25 C.F.R. § 83 are
recognized by the federal government. In June 2010, the Shinnecock Indian Nation was
acknowledged by the Department of Interior and became the 565th tribe. See Final Deter-
mination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Shinnecock Indian Nation, 75 Fed. Reg.
34,760 (June 18, 2010).
274. For an explanation of aboriginal title, see Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32
MINN. L. REV. 28 (1947).
275. See generally APRIL SCHWARTZ & MARY JO B. HUNTER, UNITED STATES TRIBAL COURTS
DIRECTORY (3d ed. 2008) (compiling a list of tribal courts); see also Tribal Justice Systems,
NAT’L TRIBAL JUSTICE RES. CTR., http://web.archive.org/web/20010603122231/http://
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/pages/justice.htm (last visited July 11, 2011) (outlining a
brief history of and listing tribal courts).
276. See SCHWARTZ & HUNTER, supra note 275.
277. 25 C.F.R § 11.100 (2010) (listing twenty-one Courts of Indian Offenses, also
known as CFR Courts).
278. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN IN-
DIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE REPORT (2005), available at http://www.bia.gov/idc/
groups/public/documents/text/idc-001719.pdf (listing reservation population, tribal en-
rollment, employment, and other economic factors); Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Govern-
ments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8 (2009)
(describing tribal economic instability); Minzner, supra note 271.
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replicate state and federal court systems. Others have no means or
desire. Despite these differences, however, all tribal courts, big and
small, have the same jurisdiction. Resources, both human and finan-
cial, are spread thinly, and the criminal justice system represents sov-
ereignty in practice that each tribe has to manage on its own terms.
Judging by the dismal statistics,279 replication of state and federal sys-
tems has not served tribes well.
The arguments in favor of counting tribal court convictions to
achieve federal sentences that “ ‘reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense,’”280 “promot[e] respect for [federal] law,”281 and “provid[e]
just punishment”282 based on western notions of justice, represent the
explicit goals of the Sentencing Commission. Supporting these goals
by incorporating tribal convictions, however, does not promote sover-
eignty or internal power of the tribe. Unless the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s goals—uniformity in federal sentencing throughout the nation,
predictability in federal sentencing, and just desserts283—reflect inter-
nal tribal goals, tribal sovereign power is not implicated at all, much
less respected.284
IV. Respect for Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Court Decisions,
and Tribal People
Because tribes are unlike state courts and unlike one another,
incorporating tribal court convictions into a uniform federal sentenc-
ing regime to achieve a federal objective not shared by all tribes fails
to confer respect. Using the states and federal courts as the explicit
standard of true legitimacy comes at a great cost. Displacing autonomy
and tribal values that may not be shared fails to recognize the legacy
of independence and difference that has meant survival to Natives
from time immemorial. Placing a tribal court’s decision inside the
state and federal hierarchy to be used against Native individuals fails
to honor all that the tribe has achieved to regain or retain sovereignty.
279. See supra Part II.C.
280. Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note 2, at 414.
281. USSG, supra note 1, at ch. 5, pt. B1.1.; see also Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note
2, at 414.
282. USSG, supra note 1, at ch. 5, pt. B1.1.; see also Washburn, Tribal Courts, supra note
2, at 414.
283. The term “just desserts” refers to retributive justice and making the punishment
fit the crime.
284. See supra Part III.
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A. Not Counting Tribal Court Convictions Is Respectful
Should tribal court convictions count in federal sentencing? Is
counting a tribal order of conviction in a foreign sovereign’s sentenc-
ing authority the best way to “honor” what remains of a tribe’s crimi-
nal jurisdiction over its own people? I support an amendment to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines that takes into account history, differ-
ence, and “Indianness.” This Article proposes a unique collaboration
reflecting tribal-federal dual sovereignty in order to allow only one
prosecution in either court for the same course of conduct.
Recognizing difference is respectful. Understanding unique polit-
ical, geographical, and historical factors, and taking those factors into
account when evaluating criminal justice in Indian Country, is consis-
tent with respectful treatment. Given the history of denigration of tri-
bal sentencing authority, which has a long history stemming from the
aftermath of Crow Dog, enhancing federal power to sentence Indians is
not consistent with respect. Despite the Supreme Court’s original in-
tention, the Crow Dog decision represents a type of respect for tribal
sovereign authority, for a tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction to punish a
crime uniformly recognized as unacceptable within the Indian Terri-
tory, and for the power or right to hand down an appropriate punish-
ment of the perpetrator consistent with tribal values. Once Congress
decided to encroach on traditional tribal jurisdiction and supplant tri-
bal decision-making with the federal government’s view of the appro-
priate process and punishment, the degradation of tribal sovereignty
was complete. This process of disrespect began with the Major Crimes
Act and continued through the degradation of jurisdiction in Oliphant
and Duro. Counting tribal court convictions in the federal sentencing
scheme cannot restore tribes or tribal courts to a respected position.
Washburn himself considered a restoration of tribal criminal ju-
risdiction to its pre-1880s status through repeal or the abolishment of
the Major Crimes Act and mostly rejected it.285 In addition to the fact
that a repeal of the Major Crimes Act is highly unlikely, Washburn
points out the other major problems with such an idea.286 One of the
most important factors is that the United States has a federal trust
responsibility “to maintain peace and protect Indian women, children
and families on the reservation.”287
285. Washburn, Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, supra note 2, at 848–50
(2006).
286. Id. at 840.
287. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1924 Before the Subcomm. of Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 38–39 (2009) (testimony of Assoc. Att’y Gen.
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Given the encroachment on tribal power to govern in criminal
matters, counting an Indian defendant’s tribal convictions in the sub-
sequent federal case does not buttress tribal sovereignty. Tribes exist
as separate sovereigns within the federal Indian law framework for the
purpose of dual prosecution and double jeopardy interests. Respect
for inherent tribal power and authority cannot be accorded to tribes
by incorporation into the federal sentencing scheme.
The obvious reason is that counting a prior conviction in tribal
court against the Indian defendant would only serve to impact the
Indian individual negatively. Counting tribal court convictions only
means that additional criminal history points will be added solely for
the Native criminal defendant, ultimately translating into a longer fed-
eral prison sentence. This form of respect fails in its application. The
result is especially harsh given that Natives are already incarcerated in
greater numbers in state and federal custody, and once incarcerated,
they serve longer sentences than those of other races.288 Therefore,
counting tribal court sentences for the purpose of achieving uniform-
ity in federal prosecution adds insult to injury.
B. Counting Tribal Convictions Does Not Respect Tribal Authority
Counting a prior tribal court conviction in the federal sentencing
scheme becomes mere recognition of federal authority, not respect
for the tribe itself or its unique position. Consider that recognition of
tribal court sentences under the federal guidelines can operate only
to subject Indian defendants to external enhanced punishment, and
never to mitigate it. Counting a prior tribal court conviction in federal
sentencing does not register the fact that the tribal court and commu-
nity itself has already addressed the same conduct and may very well
have imposed a punishment or other appropriate redress. This kind
of recognition fails to take into account a tribe’s unique exercise of
local power and authority that could better serve the needs of the In-
dian individual and the community. Counting a tribal court convic-
tion also does not regard all of the unique factors faced by the Indian
individual and the historical constraints on tribal authority that may
have caused the criminal behavior. The prior tribal action and the
unique factors, in some cases, could provide valid reasons to mitigate,
rather than enhance, a federal sentence.
Thomas Perrelli) (“The federal government has a distinct legal, trust, and treaty obligation
to provide for public safety in tribal communities . . . .”).
288. See NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
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Counting tribal court convictions in federal courts fails to satisfy
the threshold of respect because it would negatively impact Indians.
More importantly, it fails to protect tribal court sentencing authority
in any meaningful way. Recognition in federal court of a tribal convic-
tion to increase punishment of only Indian tribal members of the sep-
arate sovereign does not directly promote tribal rights. Instead, it
promotes federal power.
A tribal criminal conviction is not automatically accorded respect
simply by being counted as a prior court conviction in the federal sen-
tencing scheme. As Judge Bruce Black summarized, “in light of the
constitutional and historical anomalies of federal, state, and tribal
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, merely assigning criminal his-
tory points to prior tribal court sentences appears as likely to exacer-
bate, as to ameliorate, sentencing disparity.”289 Because the egregious
and unconscionable sentencing disparities suffered by Native Ameri-
cans are well-documented,290 approaches taking aim at the disparate
sentences are well-taken.
Understanding that the proposed lens of respect is not workable
is not enough. There must be a suitable alternative that allows for
deferential treatment of tribal court criminal convictions, yet also con-
siders and incorporates the impact on Native individuals and commu-
nities. The conclusion to follow recognizes some alternative
approaches that may be workable in part and rests upon a novel ap-
proach that incorporates more respect for tribes, sovereignty, and in-
dividual rights.
Conclusion
Acknowledging the inherent limitations of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines to deal with tribal courts as a culturally distinct sover-
eign exercising powers outside the Constitution leads to acceptance of
USSG Rule 4A1.2(i), recognizes this distinction and as a result, does
not count tribal court convictions. Whether the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s initial reasoning for not counting tribal court convictions in the
Indian defendant’s prior criminal history was to protect federal consti-
tutional principles or to question tribal court process, the rule has
merit. The Sentencing Commission’s resolution of treating tribal
court convictions as that of a foreign nation remains the best solution
289. Bruce Black is a U.S. District Court Judge for the District of New Mexico. Black,
supra note 74, at 218.
290. NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 32.
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under the current Sentencing Guideline scheme. As applied, this rule
at least respects the difference between criminal and civil orders of
tribal courts, the difference between tribal court systems and the fed-
eral and state systems, as well as differences among tribes themselves.
Defaulting to the current rule of not counting tribal court convictions,
at least, does not exacerbate the current problem of disparate sen-
tencing and incarceration of Natives. Therefore, the status quo offers
more than Washburn’s proposed “respect” can offer.
Others have suggested, as another option, an end to the applica-
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines to Native Americans being sen-
tenced in federal court.291 This approach may be the most respectful
to tribal sentencing, the historical anomalies, and the direct hits that
tribes have taken in the criminal arena. Judge Black proposed that “we
honor self-determination by following Chief Justice Marshall’s vision
of ‘domestic dependent sovereigns’ by permitting tribal governments
to opt out of the Guidelines and create their own sentencing sys-
tem.”292 Quoting Williams v. Lee,293 Judge Black provides that a tribal
sentencing scheme would truly allow Native Americans to “make their
own laws and be ruled by them.”294
Replacing federal sentencing with tribal sentencing would pro-
mote tribal power by granting tribal courts the authority “to consider
the crimes that cause the greatest disruption of reservation life and
penalize them appropriately.”295 “It would also provide Native Ameri-
cans the opportunity to fashion their own ‘credit’ system for prior tri-
bal convictions.”296
Recognizing that a unilateral federal decision to count tribal
court convictions without tribal buy-in would not be consistent with
self-determination, Washburn originally proposed the “tribal option”
to allow tribes to determine whether their convictions should be
counted under the Sentencing Guidelines. However, allowing tribes
to participate after the fact in the punishment phase may not directly
291. Black, supra note 74, at 218.
292. Id.
293. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
294. Black, supra note 74, at 218 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (“Essentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action in-
fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id. at 218 (noting that granting tribes the authority to create their own sentencing
scheme as is the case in the District of Columbia would “allow the tribes to consider the
crimes that cause the greatest disruption of reservation life and penalize them appropri-
ately,” and “to fashion their own ‘credit’ system for prior tribal convictions”).
296. Id.
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address sentencing disparity or self-determination. Instead, respect for
tribal courts is most apparent when tribes have exclusive jurisdiction
over the individual and subject matter of the crime.297
Short of abolishing the Sentencing Guidelines, another approach
suggests a solution from the standpoint of sentencing mitigation,
namely that once the Sentencing Guidelines apply, they should fit the
individual circumstances of the defendant.298 A suggested amend-
ment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would allow for a sentenc-
ing decision to take into account economic and social factors found as
a part of reservation life, such as geographical, cultural, and political
hardships suffered by the individual Indians, that led to the crime.299
Current rules preventing the court from considering race and
socio-economic status, substance abuse problems, and lack of youthful
guidance as grounds for departure300 need to be amended to add a
“measure of mercy and understanding.”301 The idea is that Natives
facing sentences in federal court should be allowed to bring in the
negative impacts of colonial and assimilationist policies, as well as
their personal history, in order to request a reduction in the calcu-
lated federal sentencing range.302 This option provides the federal
court an additional opportunity to depart from the Sentencing Guide-
lines to fashion a just sentence based upon circumstances that exist in
Indian Country that are to the detriment of the Indian defendant.
The amendments should be adopted by the United States Sentencing
Commission as a respectful approach to tribal sovereignty and individ-
ual Indians standing before the federal bench.
297. Id.
298. See United States v. Decora, 177 F.3d 676 (S.D. 1999) (upholding a downward
departure to probation under the Sentencing Guidelines based on mitigating circum-
stances faced by Native American defendant); see also Droske, supra note 114, at 751–56.
299. Charles B. Kornmann, Injustices: Applying the Sentencing Guidelines and Other Federal
Mandates in Indian Country, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 71, 73 (2000) (“Sentencing judges are
largely prohibited from taking into account the realities in Indian Country. Under
§ 5H1.10 we can neither consider race or national origin nor the fact that we took away the
culture, the language, the religion, the land, the buffalo, the pride, and the very freedom
of Native Americans years ago. It is not only Blacks who have suffered greatly in America
but also Native Americans.”).
300. See USSG, supra note 1, § 5K2.0(d)(1) (listing circumstances specifically prohib-
ited as departures to include USSG § 5H1.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion,
and Socio-Economic Status), § 5H1.12 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Circum-
stances), and § 5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or
Abuse; Gambling Addiction, all of which impact Natives disproportionately).
301. Kornmann, Injustices, supra note 299, at 73.
302. Id.
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Instead of searching for respect in the federal sentencing
scheme, respect for the tribe, tribal sovereignty, and jurisdiction
should begin at the investigation and prosecution phase of any crimi-
nal proceeding. Allowing a tribe to participate in addressing crime
and punishment within its own jurisdiction prior to or separate from a
federal prosecution, conviction, and sentence is key to addressing
crime on the reservation. Because jurisdiction was usurped by the Ma-
jor Crimes Act and denigrated over time, beginning with restoring
respect at the shared jurisdictional level is an appropriate response.
In the interest of tribal autonomy and recognizing differences
among tribes, tribal criminal decisions should be respected by the De-
partment of Justice and the federal courts. Such a decision begins with
incorporating or factoring in the community and the tribal approach
to investigation, identification, and ultimately, resolution of crime and
safety matters. Those tribes that have the resources and structure to
prosecute and punish crime on the reservation, and choose to do so,
should be allowed to, from the onset of the crime and investigation.
In those cases, the U.S. Attorney’s Office would be able to then de-
cline a successive federal prosecution for the same conduct that has
been resolved appropriately by the Indian community impacted.
Those tribes that have fewer resources to address crime and safety
matters could determine the appropriate circumstances to work coop-
eratively with the federal officials in the enforcement, investigation,
and prosecution of crime on the reservation.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office has long had such a policy that pre-
cludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution after a
prior state or federal prosecution based upon the same or similar
acts.303 Known as the dual and successive prosecution policy or “Petite
Policy,” it precludes a federal prosecution where the defendant’s con-
duct has formed the basis of a state prosecution.304 The federal “Petite
Policy” establishes guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion by the Department of Justice “in determining whether to bring a
federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transac-
303. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960) (“[S]everal offenses arising
out of a single transaction . . . should not be the basis of multiple [federal] prosecutions”
in different federal districts.).
304. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.031, available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.
031.
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tions involved in a prior state or federal proceeding.”305 As explained
by the Department of Justice, the purpose of the policy is to:
[V]indicate substantial federal interests through appropriate fed-
eral prosecutions, to protect persons charged with criminal con-
duct from the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions and
punishments for substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s), to
promote efficient utilization of Department resources, and to pro-
mote coordination and cooperation between federal and state
prosecutors.306
Similarly, the development of a tribal policy to determine juris-
diction in tribal or federal court prior to issuance of a federal indict-
ment would serve the several relevant and important purposes listed
above and address the respect problem at its core: jurisdiction and
resources. Importantly, the Petite Policy’s explicit goal “to insure the
most efficient use of [limited] law enforcement resources, whenever a
matter involves overlapping . . . jurisdiction,”307 applies with equal
force to the federal and tribal relationship. The Department of Jus-
tice’s explicit policy directing “federal prosecutors [to], as soon as pos-
sible, consult with their state counterparts to determine the most
appropriate single forum in which to proceed to satisfy the substantial
federal and state interests involved, and, if possible, to resolve all crim-
inal liability for the acts in question,”308 applies to Indian Country
more so than to the states.
A decision on which interests are most affected (tribal or federal)
and which entity has the best resources to address the crime, accord-
ing to tribal needs and values, would restore tribes to the position of
being able to participate in their own sovereignty, to protect the rights
of the accused, and to define the process afforded to criminal
defendants.
Under any scenario, once a tribe has addressed a matter in tribal
court, such a decision should be entitled to deference by the federal
courts. The federal prosecutor should take note of the resolution by
the tribal community, whether in court or by a traditional method,
and factor that into a decision to prosecute, as well as in final sentenc-
ing. Incorporating tribal input and resolution in addressing crime on
the reservation into the federal sentence is the beginning of respect.
305. Id. § 9-2.031A (citing Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977) and Petite v.
United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960)).
306. Id. § 9-2.031A.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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